Erwan Lagadec, Woodrow Wilson Center Public Policy Scholar
Sir Rodric Braithwaite (commentator), Woodrow Wilson Center Public Policy Scholar

According to Erwan Lagadec, politically expedient "ideas (especially concerning multilateralism) became interests" for both sides of the transatlantic disagreement over Iraq, as the true issues and interests at stake were lost in the tumult of the politically-corrupted international debate. The disagreement was not handled in the purely diplomatic realm, but was tainted by domestic concerns—even at the United Nations, the open, Wilsonian forum for the debate, which became a "political microcosm," where messy politics, and not subtle and nuanced diplomacy, reigned. Had the issues not become so politicized, but "remained diplomatic in nature," Lagadec posited that the two sides would have found they shared much with regard to their respective worldviews. Instead, this "common analytical ground" was rejected because of political considerations, and sight of "real interests" was lost.

The protagonists of the international disagreement were high-profile, unelected (and therefore unrestrained by constituencies) policymakers or presidents constrained by domestic pressures and promises (Lagadec noted, "while analysts and diplomats can change their minds... politicians cannot backtrack on publicly avowed platforms"). Here the conflict became distorted and took the form of "preexisting sets of prejudices." With the disagreement translated from the language of diplomats into something baser and more popularly understood, each nation's public became involved, and, in order to draw on this popular support, both presidents embraced the new, common "ideological framework of understanding," turning the international debate into a war of these ideas, especially over multipolarity. Lagadec argued that the crisis would not have been so politicized had Britain and Russia stood in for the United States and France (with such easily "transferable clichés" between them) as the most vocal promoter and opponent, respectively, of an Iraq invasion.

At the U.N., the debate "emphasized ideas rather than interests." 9/11 revolutionized the way America perceived threats, their urgency, and the "position of the red line that separates practical interests and ideological appreciations." However, the rest of the world, and especially Europe, was not roused to share what the U.S. believed to be its new, actual interests. Thus, if the U.S. could not sell its interests at the UN, it would try to sell ideology. France responded with its own "fundamentalist" ideology, based on multipolarity. Lagadec argued that a primary cause for the "war of words," was that "multipolarity," the word at the center of it all, did not carry the same meaning for both sides. Chirac's concept of multipolarity was equilibrium among the great powers—a global Westphalian balance of power whose cohesion was guaranteed by the U.N. and "soft" power. In contrast, Condoleezza Rice in 2003, mocking the nostalgia of its European supporters, derided multipolarity as a "theory of rivalry; of competing interests—and, at its worst, competing values," and blamed it for leading to the 20th century's major wars. Previous U.S. positions, including the 2002 National Security Strategy, however, held the U.N., international cooperation, and other features of Chirac's worldview in high regard, as demonstrated by the "sheer recurrence of multipolar American approaches," such as with North Korea, Liberia, and even the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Unfortunately, the entry of domestic politics into the Iraq debate dramatically changed the Bush administration's public argument concerning multipolarity, and the common ground between the two positions was ignored. Lagadec also criticized the Chiracian worldview, noting that the world cannot always depend on the Security Council to act, and that Europe was failing to appreciate the value of the public goods and security the U.S. provides, which might be withdrawn if this rhetoric challenging it continues. Instead, he suggested, for Europe to become a geopolitical power, it should complement, not counter, American might, such as it is presently doing in Kosovo and Afghanistan.

Sir Rodric Braithwaite was somewhat more optimistic, believing that transatlantic relations are not broken beyond repair, and that many common interests still remain between the U.S. and Europe. He agreed with the notion of "transferable clichés," but dismissed as "Fanta-politica" the claim that the British and Russians as the key players would have handled better the disagreement over Iraq, arguing that his countrymen were "no more capable of analyzing this rationally than others" (later referencing Suez and the Falklands). A lifelong diplomat, he had less faith in pure and professional diplomacy than Lagadec. Debunking the "myth of professional diplomacy," he stated that in foreign affairs, inevitably popular opinion does get involved, and diplomats must take this reality into account. But in the end, like politicians, policy makers find reality is too complex, and "they have to simplify by dealing with slogans, myths, and stereotypes."

The discussion during the Q&A was wide-ranging, and touched upon the "the toolbox of clichés" available for use among Britain, France, and America, the rewriting of the geopolitical equations with the new variable of the trans- or non-state actors, and the dim prospects for the E.U. as a true federation. Lagadec detected a German accent in Chirac's arguments and positions, noting that the French president had adopted a traditionally German position, perhaps part of an effort to "restart the Franco-German European engine." For Braithwaite, the French assumed that to create a "cohesive [European] political organization," they must define Europe as different from America — a difficult task to do "without annoying the others [in the transatlantic relationship] badly."