What is at Stake in the Upcoming Slovak Parliamentary Elections

The likely return to power of three-time former Prime Minister Robert Fico in Slovakia’s September 30 election would signal a potentially significant crack in European support for Ukraine. While the contours of a Fico-led coalition remain uncertain, his Smer (Direction) party and its likeliest coalition partners all represent voters with a nationalist outlook, affinity for Russia, and skepticism about Slovakia’s Western orientation. Fico has promised them to oppose sanctions on Russia as well as military aid and NATO membership for Ukraine. (He has been cautiously open to EU membership for Ukraine.)

The election of a Smer-led government after 19 months of ardent and generous Slovak support for Ukraine would pack a symbolic punch felt beyond Slovakia’s borders. If it happens, though, one should not attribute the result to declining public support for Ukraine. As with voters anywhere, foreign policy has little impact on how Slovaks vote. Moreover, Slovakia’s 5% threshold for election to parliament and dispersed parties mean that the ballots of up to a quarter of voters will not count for elected representation. 

The affinity for Russia and skepticism of the West expressed by roughly half of Slovaks are no recent phenomena. These attitudes trace their roots to the 19th century emergence of a Slovak national identity grounded in pan-Slavism, with Russia at its center. To the consternation of those of us Western diplomats who served in Slovakia, such views persist despite the enormous gains Slovaks have enjoyed thanks to their decision, following independence in 1993, to cast their destiny in the West.   

If Slovakia’s next government is indeed a Fico-led coalition of nationalist, Russia-favoring parties, the tangible impact on Ukraine might be modest. Slovakia has limited weapons stocks left that it could transfer to Ukraine, significant EU sanctions are already in place, and NATO accession lies down the road.

Today, debates about the foreign policy impact of Fico’s expected return to power center on his “pragmatism.” Many point optimistically to his earlier terms in office, during which, despite his pugnacious rhetoric at home, he sought to position Slovakia within the “core” of the EU and as a reliable NATO ally. Fico’s focus, in any case, has always been at home. 

Nevertheless, expecting Fico to revert to form on foreign policy could prove disappointing. The world has changed since Fico was last in power in 2018, and he is a master at adapting to political context. Factors that could drive Fico toward a more contentious relationship with Allies and fellow EU members, especially on Ukraine, include:

• The domestic political salience of Ukraine/Russia issues in Slovakia. While the war in Ukraine will decide few votes, it has animated the pro-Russia voters who support Smer and its likely coalition partners. This public will easily grasp the binary nature of military support for Ukraine, sanctions against Russia, and NATO membership for Ukraine, thus constraining Fico’s room to diverge from his rhetoric. 

• Populist politics. Over the five years since Fico last led Slovakia, the populist style of politics has burgeoned globally. Fico, long practiced in the style, has exploited the trend. He fueled his remarkable political resurrection with issues inflaming global disinformation—COVID, the Ukraine war, and, an old standby, migration. As Slovakia’s GLOBSEC think tank and others have amply documented, the Slovak public is particularly susceptible to disinformation.  This vulnerability is both cause and effect of Russia’s disproportionate messaging investment in Slovakia.

• Fico’s humiliation in 2018. Fico’s most recent term as Prime Minister ended when he was forced from office amid national revulsion over the February 2018 murders of investigative journalist Jan Kuciak and his fiancée. (Kuciak had documented corrupt ties among Fico insiders, criminal justice authorities, and the Calabrian ‘Ndrangheta mafia.) Fico, Slovakia’s canniest politician of this century, is not one to be motivated by retribution or emotion. His experience in 2018, however, reportedly left him feeling abandoned by Western partners. If true, he might now see less value in accommodating Allies and fellow EU members.

• Victor Orban. When Fico and Hungarian Prime Minister Orban overlapped earlier in power, their relations suffered from their competing nationalist attitudes towards Slovakia’s history in the Hungarian kingdom and its large, present-day ethnic Hungarian minority. Relations are now much closer, with each publicly expressing respect for the other. (Fico recently even explained away Orban’s claim that Slovakia is a “breakaway territory” of Hungary.) On Ukraine/Russia and perhaps other issues, Fico and Orban could wind up shielding each other from isolation within the EU and NATO.

The Orban factor informs debate about whether a Fico government could or would pursue an authoritarian domestic agenda putting it at odds with other Western governments. Fico, for example, has long had a fiercely antagonistic relationship with Slovakia’s dynamic independent media. Would he try, a la Orban, to curtail its space? His earlier governments did not do so, even when Smer ruled alone from 2012 to 2016. But, again, the global political landscape has changed. One factor that has not, however, is the resistance Fico would face from Slovakia’s formidable civil society. Slovak activists and NGOs cut their teeth in response to Slovakia’s authoritarian government of the 1990s and demonstrated their enduring strength after the Kuciak murders in 2018. 

A Fico-led coalition government is by no means the certain outcome of the upcoming election. Smer, while consistently topping the polls for the past six months, has enjoyed a polling lead of only 3% to 5% over the liberal-democratic Progressive Slovakia (PS) party for most of that time. A large number of undecided voters and a recent history of surprise outcomes in Slovak elections give PS hope of victory. Even if it does win, though, PS could face a steep challenge in assembling a coalition government.

If Slovakia’s next government is indeed a Fico-led coalition of nationalist, Russia-favoring parties, the tangible impact on Ukraine might be modest. Slovakia has limited weapons stocks left that it could transfer to Ukraine, significant EU sanctions are already in place, and NATO accession lies down the road.

A modest tanglible outcome on Ukraine would not, however, be trivial. The turnaround in Slovak government rhetoric brought by a Fico government would in itself weaken international cohesion in support of Ukraine. Slovakia’s Western friends must be ready for what may prove a more difficult relationship with Slovakia ahead.

Adam Sterling is a retired Foreign Service Officer who served as U.S. Ambassador to the Slovak Republic from 2016 to 2019.