Since early 2026, China has been warming ties with traditional American allies, including Canada and Britain. Prime Ministers Carney and Starmer became the first leaders from their countries to visit China in nearly a decade, and leaders from other nations have also followed suit in the last few months. 

What is China seeking through these diplomatic “turnarounds,” as Xi Jinping has called them? And what should we watch for as these relationships evolve? 

This shift marks the first chapter in the so-called “middle powers play,” a point Canadian Prime Minister Carney bluntly described in his Davos speech last month. As uncertainty with Washington grows, countries like Canada and Britain are looking for more room to maneuver. They are not aligning with China, but they are seeking options and political leverage in their strategies to avoid being squeezed by larger powers. 

For China, this is an opportunity to secure both perception and practical victories. The imagery of a line of global leaders traveling to Beijing sends a clear message. Canada and Britain are joined by South Korea, France, Finland, Uruguay, and soon Germany in reinforcing this narrative. Xi Jinping values the spectacle of foreign leaders publicly acknowledging China as a predictable partner in a new world order: one where China sits at the center of global gravity alongside the United States. 

Second, China is eager to capitalize on whatever advantages it can, from major victories to minor wins. Chinese electric vehicles have long been shut out of the Canadian market, for example, due to a high tariff rate of 100-percent imposed in coordination with the United States. It has now dropped to 6-percent, a significant decline. China is cracking open the door to the North American car market. 

In Britain, the pharmaceutical company AstraZeneca has agreed to invest $15 billion in China to expand research, development, and manufacturing. For almost a decade, the possibility of "de-risking China" has occupied discussion in the Western democratic world, so while the shifts are incremental, the turnaround is significant. Xi Jinping is more than pleased to take credit for this shift. 

What remains unclear is the extent to which these shifts can be sustained. Structural differences separate China and much of the collective free West. Fundamental differences on key human rights, economic, and security issues, such as disputes over excess capacity, trade imbalances, Hong Kong, Tibet, Taiwan, Xinjiang, and the South China Sea, remain points of contention. China’s activity in the last decade, coercing and punishing Canada, Britain, and European nations over these issues, will always serve as a cautionary tale for Western leaders. 

Economically, the stakes are significant. As developed economies focus on rebuilding their industrial bases, bolstering the middle class and improving quality of life, domestic politics may become contentious if citizens fear that their industries and jobs are at risk. What can Canada and Britain gain from China, beyond increased exports of whiskey and agricultural products? 

Ontario Premier Doug Ford, for instance, criticized Carney's trip to Beijing, stating, "China now has a foothold in the Canadian market and will use it to their full advantage at the expense of Canadian workers." There is a reason tariffs on Chinese electric cars remain at 45-percent across the rest of Europe: there are very real concerns at play. 

To get a sense of the trajectory of Canada and Britain’s ties with China, it is essential to monitor the “bread and butter” economic issues that figures like Carney and Starmer must tend to as leaders of democracies. This may be a world order shaped by middle powers, but as always, all geopolitics are local.