The killing of "El Mencho" marks a major shift in Mexico’s security landscape, signaling a peak in state tactical capacity while raising critical questions about whether the cartel will maintain its dominance or fracture under new leadership.
The killing of Nemesio Rubén Oseguera Cervantes, leader of the Cártel Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG), better known as “El Mencho,” marks one of the most significant blows against organized crime in Mexico in more than a decade. The operation, carried out by Mexican military forces with US intelligence support, triggered an unprecedented but short-lived wave of retaliatory violence across roughly 20 states, with the highest concentration in Jalisco.
While the scale of the violence was alarming, its rapid dissipation suggests a demonstration of reach rather than a sustainable deterrence strategy. The central question now is whether CJNG undergoes a clean leadership succession or fractures internally, a dynamic that will shape Mexico’s security trajectory in the months ahead.
This brief argues that:
On February 22, 2026, Mexican security forces conducted a high-risk operation in Jalisco targeting El Mencho. According to official accounts, he was wounded during the engagement and died in transit. Within hours, CJNG launched a coordinated nationwide offensive involving road blockades, vehicle arson, shootings, and attacks on civilian infrastructure.
The violence was most intense in Guadalajara and parts of Jalisco, with disruptions to schools, public transport, and airports. Federal and state authorities activated emergency security protocols as foreign governments issued shelter-in-place advisories for their citizens. Despite its intensity, the violence largely subsided within a single day.
El Mencho had evaded capture for more than a decade, shielded by a combination of sophisticated counter-intelligence, territorial control, and systemic corruption. Successfully neutralizing him represents a non-trivial institutional achievement for the Mexican state and suggests improvements in operational discipline, intelligence coordination, and leak prevention.
The operation also reflects continuity with the security approach being pursued under President Claudia Sheinbaum and her security team, particularly Interior Security Secretary Omar García Harfuch, who has long viewed CJNG as a priority threat.
CJNG has been on the ascendant in recent years, expanding territorially and operationally at a moment when the Sinaloa Cartel has fractured into competing factions. That fragmentation weakened a once-dominant rival and created openings CJNG exploited across western and central Mexico.
El Mencho’s removal could have second-order effects. It may slow CJNG’s expansion; it could also create opportunities for Sinaloa factions to push back against CJNG incursions in contested territories. Ultimately, El Mencho’s removal is not merely a tactical success against one man, but a strategic disruption likely to reshape the entire criminal landscape.
From its origins, CJNG has relied on high-visibility, spectacular violence – including public executions, attacks on security forces and mass arson – as a central branding and intimidation tactic. The group’s retaliation following El Mencho’s death was consistent with this historical pattern.
This reliance on spectacle is precisely why targeting El Mencho was strategically sound:
The scale of the retaliatory violence was unprecedented in its coordination, but its brevity is significant. Most incidents ended within hours. This suggests that CJNG has the capacity to disrupt and intimidate, but limited ability to sustain prolonged violent confrontation with the state.
Rather than signaling state collapse, the episode resembled a cartel stress response to leadership loss. Whether CJNG can move beyond that response depends on its internal cohesion.
The most important variable to monitor is CJNG’s internal transition. A clean leadership succession would likely preserve the status quo, with continued criminal activity but no dramatic escalation of violence. However, internal fragmentation could trigger localized violence, particularly in Jalisco, Guanajuato, and Michoacán, mirroring dynamics currently seen in Sinaloa.
The killing of El Mencho underscores a persistent truth, namely that removing kingpins is neither sufficient nor irrelevant. Mexico’s long-term response to drug trafficking and organized crime must remain multidimensional, combining:
Targeting cartel leadership is a necessary component of this strategy, but it must be embedded within a broader framework aimed at reducing violence, not just reshuffling criminal hierarchies.
The removal of El Mencho represents a meaningful assertion of Mexican state authority against one of the country’s most violent criminal organizations. The chaos that followed was real, but temporary. In the medium term, the focus shifts to the resilience of the CJNG’s decentralized cells and the Mexican government's capacity to sustain a comprehensive security strategy.
