As of spring 2026, the second Trump administration is aggressively treating critical minerals as a national security priority, using trade tools and industrial subsidies to break Chinese dominance and rebuild domestic processing capacity, though long-term success remains dependent on overcoming entrenched permitting and infrastructure hurdles.
Fourteen months into the second Trump administration, critical minerals have emerged as a central pillar of US economic and national security policy. Rare earth elements, lithium, copper, graphite, and dozens of other materials underpin modern industrial power: they are essential to advanced weapons systems, semiconductor manufacturing, artificial intelligence infrastructure, data centers, electric grids, and emerging energy technologies. As demand accelerates and geopolitical competition intensifies, the strategic importance of these resources has become impossible for policymakers to ignore.
For decades, however, the United States largely treated mining and mineral supply chains as commercial sectors rather than strategic industries. Global supply chains were allowed to consolidate around the lowest-cost producers, and the downstream stages of processing and refining became increasingly concentrated in China. Strategy was dominated by a “value-for-money” perspective, understandably so in a highly globalized economy. By the early 2020s, however, the consequences of that approach are clear: the United States has become heavily dependent on foreign suppliers for many critical materials and lacks domestic capacity in key stages of mineral processing.
The second Trump administration entered office promising to reverse these vulnerabilities. Through executive orders, trade investigations, financing mechanisms, and diplomatic initiatives, the administration has attempted to reposition critical minerals as a cornerstone of US economic statecraft.
As of spring 2026, the results are mixed but significant. The administration has clearly elevated the strategic importance of mineral supply chains and introduced a series of new policy tools aimed at reshaping them. At the same time, structural challenges – such as long permitting timelines, limited refining capacity, geopolitical trade-offs, and entrenched Chinese dominance in key segments of the supply chain – remain formidable.
The question now is whether the administration’s efforts represent the beginnings of a durable strategy, or merely the early stages of a policy experiment. Or to put it more directly, will America stay the course?
Over the past year, the administration has taken a series of actions that signal a fundamental shift in US thinking about mineral supply chains. Executive orders elevated critical minerals to a national priority. Trade tools are being deployed to confront supply vulnerabilities. Federal financing mechanisms are beginning to support domestic mining and processing projects.
Yet the strategy remains incomplete. Most mining projects take a decade or more to reach production, and rebuilding downstream industrial capacity will require sustained policy support across multiple administrations.
Mahnaz Khan, Vice President for Policy on Critical Supply Chains at the Silverado Policy Accelerator, has argued that the administration’s approach is best understood as unfolding in several distinct phases. The first phase focused on strategic signaling, as executive actions placed critical minerals at the center of national policy and instructed federal agencies to identify vulnerabilities in supply chains. The second phase introduced trade confrontation and supply-chain risk management, including investigations into imports of processed minerals and derivative products under Section 232 authorities.
A third phase saw the emergence of industrial policy tools, including federal financing mechanisms, loan guarantees, and equity investments designed to catalyze domestic production. The final phase now emerging emphasizes international partnerships and supply diversification, as the United States seeks to work with allied producers and emerging mineral economies to reduce global supply-chain concentration.
Seen through this lens, what may appear as a fragmented set of initiatives is actually a layered strategy, one that combines trade policy, industrial policy, and international diplomacy. The multi-billion-dollar question is whether those pieces will ultimately form a coherent whole.
Visiting Fellow Duncan Wood speaks with Amanda Van Dyke and Mahnaz Khan on critical minerals policies under the Trump Administration
Over the past three decades, China has systematically built dominance across the mineral supply chain. While Chinese mines produce significant volumes of certain minerals, the country’s real advantage lies in downstream activities, particularly refining, chemical processing, and advanced manufacturing. For many materials, Chinese firms control between 60 and 90-percent of global processing capacity. Even when minerals are mined elsewhere (even in the United States), they are often shipped to China for refining before entering global supply chains. The United States’ dependence on Chinese processing has therefore become a major strategic concern.
The Trump administration has responded by expanding the focus of mineral policy beyond extraction alone. Trade investigations and policy reviews now examine processed minerals, alloys, magnets, battery components, and other derivative products, reflecting an effort to address vulnerabilities further downstream in the supply chain.
This shift represents a significant conceptual evolution. Earlier policy debates often focused narrowly on mining production. The new approach recognizes that supply-chain resilience requires attention to the entire value chain, from exploration and extraction to processing, manufacturing, and recycling.
One of the most striking features of the Trump administration’s minerals strategy is the re-emergence of industrial policy in a sector long considered outside the realm of government planning. For decades, Western governments largely avoided coordinated industrial strategies for mining and mineral processing. Market forces determined investment decisions, and governments intervened primarily through environmental regulation or trade policy.
Of course, China took a different approach. Through a combination of long-term planning, state-backed investment, and coordinated industrial development, Chinese policymakers systematically built domestic capacity across the mineral supply chain.
According to critical minerals analyst Amanda Van Dyke, this strategic approach has given China a structural advantage that Western economies are only now beginning to confront. From her perspective, the most important development in recent US policy is simply that the United States now recognizes the need for a coordinated strategy at all.
Beyond that epiphany, however, Washington is deploying a range of tools, including export credit financing, loan guarantees, and strategic investment partnerships, to rebuild mineral supply chains. This shift reflects a broader rethinking of economic policy in an era of strategic competition. Critical minerals are no longer viewed merely as commodities but as foundational inputs for advanced industries. In this sense, the emerging US strategy mirrors earlier transformations in semiconductor policy, where national security concerns prompted new forms of government support for domestic production.
Expanding domestic mining production remains one of the most difficult aspects of the US minerals strategy. Mining projects in the United States often face permitting timelines that stretch for a decade or longer. Environmental reviews, legal challenges, and local opposition can significantly delay development even when projects ultimately receive approval.
The Trump administration has attempted to address this challenge through executive actions aimed at streamlining permitting processes and prioritizing strategic mineral projects. These measures have begun to reduce some regulatory uncertainty and signal federal support for domestic mining.
Nevertheless, the structural constraints remain substantial. Even if permitting reforms accelerate project approvals, new mines require significant capital investment and infrastructure development before reaching production. As a result, the benefits of current policies may not fully materialize for many years, and a “stay the course” attitude will be needed from future administrations.
Although extraction and production of new raw materials must be a priority for the long-term strength of American critical minerals supply chains, the most significant immediate obstacle to US mineral security lies in processing and refining. China’s dominance in these stages of the supply chain remains overwhelming. For many materials, Chinese firms control the majority of global refining capacity.
Without domestic processing facilities, minerals extracted in the United States or allied countries often must still pass through Chinese refining operations before entering global markets. Recognizing this vulnerability, the Trump administration has begun supporting investments in refining facilities and advanced manufacturing projects. The goal is to rebuild the industrial ecosystem surrounding critical minerals, transforming raw materials into magnets, battery components, alloys, and other advanced products.
Achieving this objective will require substantial investment and long-term policy commitment. Building processing plants is capital-intensive and technologically complex. Working hand-in-hand with the private sector, at home and abroad, is going to be essential to achieving the administration’s goals.
Visiting Fellow Duncan Wood speaks with Amanda Van Dyke and Mahnaz Khan on critical minerals policies under the Trump Administration
Beyond land-based mining, policymakers have also started to explore new frontiers of mineral supply, including the ocean floor. Deep-sea polymetallic nodules contain significant concentrations of nickel, cobalt, copper, and rare earth elements. Some analysts argue that these deposits could provide an alternative source of critical materials for the global economy.
The Trump administration has signaled interest in supporting research and potential development of seabed mineral resources. In April 2025, it issued an Executive Order, "Unleashing America's Offshore Critical Minerals and Resources,” that directs federal agencies to accelerate permitting for mining the US continental shelf and deep seabed. This reflects frustration on the part of the administration and many in the sector who lament the failure of the International Seabed Authority (ISA) to agree on established rules for a global seabed mining regime.
A central tension in the administration’s policy lies in the balance between international partnerships and domestic self-sufficiency. On one hand, the administration has pursued a series of agreements with mineral-producing partners, such as Australia. These partnerships aim to diversify supply chains, coordinate investment, and reduce dependence on dominant suppliers. Such cooperation reflects a simple reality: the United States does not possess all the mineral resources it requires. Most key materials are concentrated in other parts of the world.
On the other hand, the administration has also emphasized expanding domestic production. Federal agencies have identified potential mining projects, accelerated investment support, and encouraged new exploration. The result is a hybrid model that seeks to combine domestic capability with allied supply chains. Rather than full independence, the goal appears to be strategic diversification to ensure that no single country or region controls the flow of critical inputs.
Among the more unusual developments in the geopolitics of minerals has been the renewed US interest in Greenland. The Arctic territory possesses potential deposits of rare earth elements, uranium, and other strategic minerals. At the same time, its location gives it broader geopolitical importance in an era of expanding Arctic shipping routes and resource exploration.
While interest in Greenland has sometimes been treated as a curiosity in political debates, the underlying strategic logic is clear. The Arctic is emerging as a new frontier of resource development, and access to its mineral resources could have long-term implications for global supply chains.
Yet the economic challenges remain formidable. Mining in Greenland faces high costs, limited infrastructure, and environmental constraints. Even under favorable conditions, most projects would require many years to reach commercial production. For the United States, Greenland therefore represents a long-term strategic option rather than an immediate supply solution.
Critical minerals are rapidly becoming one of the defining economic and geopolitical issues of the twenty-first century. One year into the second Trump administration, the United States has begun to treat these materials as the strategic assets they truly are. Through executive actions, trade policy, and industrial investment, Washington has taken the first steps toward rebuilding domestic mineral supply chains and reducing dependence on concentrated global suppliers.
But the transformation required to achieve true supply-chain resilience will take years, if not decades. What is needed now is consistency and a long-term commitment to working with the private sector, foreign partners, and allies to reduce the vulnerabilities that have plagued the industry for far too long.
