Book Discussion: "Persian Dreams: Moscow and Tehran since the Fall of the Shah"

At a recent book discussion cosponsored by the Middle East Program and the Kennan Institute, John Parker, Chief, Division for Caucasus and Central Asia, Office for Russian and Eurasian Analysis, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, U.S. Department of State, and former Public Policy Scholar, Woodrow Wilson Center, discussed the complex history of relations between Russia and Iran.

Parker emphasized the importance of his residence at the Wilson Center in conceptualizing and writing his book, Persian Dreams, as well as in establishing essential contacts with Russian sources.

According to Parker, Iran and Russia have a history of engagement and cooperation even while they have had serious disagreements. In 1992, for example, Russia and Iran backed different sides in the civil war in Tajikistan, yet began to negotiate the Bushehr nuclear power plant contract. Yeltsin-era Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev told Parker that Moscow's relations with Tehran during this period were healthy and even quite good. Russian expert Alexei Malashenko cautioned, however, that for Russia engagement with Iran is a strategy, while for Iran cooperation with Russia is just a tactic.

In the post-Soviet period, and especially since the 1999 NATO bombing of Serbia, Parker recounted, some in Moscow have argued that the West wants to dominate Russia, and that Russia should therefore maintain an informal alliance with Iran. But that line has been opposed by those who warn that Moscow's chances of fundamentally influencing Tehran's policies are slim. They add that no one can predict the consequences of a total change in the balance of forces in the Middle East, which would be inevitable were Iran to master the production of weapons of mass destruction and the means of delivering them.

On the nuclear issue, Moscow's record under President Yeltsin was tortured and mixed at best, Parker said. Under Putin, Russia became more consistent in using a mixture of engagement and pressure to encourage Tehran to restrain its nuclear program. This pressure included slowing down construction of Bushehr, drawing out negotiations on an agreement for the return of spent nuclear fuel, and supporting a string of IAEA and UN Security Council resolutions critical of Iran. This approach seemed to work while Iranian President Khatami was in office. Since Ahmadinejad was elected in 2005, however, Russian tactics have failed to yield results, and Iran has abandoned suspension and forged ahead with its nuclear enrichment program.

For a variety of reasons, in Parker's view, Russia over the years has not pressed Iran harder to abandon its military nuclear program. Russia's assessment of Iran's progress on rearmament and nuclear enrichment has been more relaxed than that of others. Russia has also been reluctant to spoil cooperation with Iran on regional issues, particularly the Tajik peace process and pre-9/11 opposition to the Taliban. Russia has also hoped for greater profits from trade with Iran, though volumes still remain unimpressive. Moscow also has not wanted to spoil its chances for a long-term improvement of position in Iran.

As a result, Parker argued, Tehran during the Ahmadinejad years has been more successful in using Moscow to shield Iran's military nuclear program than Moscow has been in using its leverage and contacts with Tehran to restrain this program. Despite Russia's successes in softening UN Security Council resolutions on Iran, Islamic Republic leaders have just turned around and – to Moscow's chagrin – declared them illegal, Parker explained. Russia, by repeatedly protecting Iran from greater international pressure, has thus arguably contributed to increasing the odds that the Islamic Republic will eventually be able to slip out of the nonproliferation box.

Parker concluded that the future of the Russo-Iranian relationship is nevertheless difficult to predict. Greater Russian pressure on Iran cannot be precluded, nor can the return of a more tactical flexibility in Tehran's policies be ruled out.