"The Asian integration movement is an experiment reflecting far-reaching political and economic shifts. It is partly a natural outgrowth of globalization and partly an artificial construct reflecting conscious strategic judgments in key Asian capitals," according to Ellen Frost's new book, Asia's New Regionalism. Growing out of the core integration movement represented by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), this new conception of Asian regionalism incorporates a broad area stretching from India in the west to New Zealand in the east, and ranges as far north as South Korea and Japan. Is this phenomenon real or merely rhetorical? At a February 11 Asia Program event cosponsored by the Asia Society, Frost discussed Asian regionalism and its implications for policies in the region and for the United States.

According to Frost, this Asian integration movement was spurred by a combination of critical global and regional transitions. The emergence of an increasing number of regional entities (including the European Union (EU) and North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)) as well as a growing awareness of transnational issues (such as air and water pollution, climate change, and pandemic diseases) awakened Asian countries to the potential usefulness of establishing regional blocs. It was, however, the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis that propelled Asian countries into further concrete actions. Frost asserted that "the austere U.S. response" to the crisis, in contrast to Washington's prompt action during the 1994 Mexican collapse, contributed significantly to forming Asia's regional identity and the urgency of its own institution building, which ultimately was devoted to reflecting and shaping Asia's interests. In addition, China's growing influence in the region further accelerated the process of Asian integration. While welcoming and benefiting from China's rapid economic growth, Asian countries, particularly members of ASEAN, resorted to regional cooperation as a strategic opportunity to check and balance China as a newly emerging great power.

Where does the Asian integration initiative stand? And what does it imply for the rest of the world? Frost noted that Asian regionalism is real but far from being a solid, sustainable, and institutionalized entity like the EU. In an ideal world, Asian integration would lead to regional and global peace and prosperity by establishing common ground for discussion and peaceful settlement of the world's critical issues. Indeed, there has been no armed conflict between members of ASEAN since its birth in 1967, while China has demonstrated regionally responsible leadership in both managing the Asian financial crisis and in the ongoing six-party talks. Despite such tangible examples, several challenges faced by Asia cast doubt on its aspirations for creating a meaningful regional community: Asia's heavy involvement in a global economic network; the wide cultural and geographical distance among countries; a strong pursuit of national autonomy (as a consequence of past colonial experiences); and unresolved historical problems and lingering interstate hostilities (China-Japan-South Korea). More importantly, Frost stressed, "a core paradox of Asia's new regionalism" lies in the very nature of the movement per se—that is, a "government-driven top-down" initiative under the leadership of a weak ASEAN has undercut solidarity among nations.

Speaking about the notion of the United States being excluded from the process of Asian community building, Frost predicted that the United States would not be ejected from Asia. Yet, U.S. influence in the region might weaken in the absence of further engagement efforts. Conceiving of Asian regionalism in a complex global scene, she interpreted it as a matter of "balance of influence." As a giant market and central provider of military assistance to the region, the United States is the indispensable partner for Asians. Moreover, Asians seek a U.S. presence in the region as a strategic counter-balance to the rise of China, especially in the context of preserving regional stability for the weaker states. Nonetheless, in political calculations of "overall influence" in the region, the rise of China is likely to be a key factor in eroding the preeminence of the United States. Noting the U.S. dismissal of the Asian integration movement as a "talk-shop," Frost concluded with a recommendation that the United States establish a new policy in dealing with Asia as a region so as to consolidate its own status as well as its interests in Asia.

In response to Frost's comprehensive overview on Asian regionalism, commentator Tion Kwa spoke about the region's internal shifts in the wake of integration movements. According to Kwa, Asians have been experiencing two separate but somewhat contradictory transformations—westernization and China-based orientalization. An increasing number of Asians, specifically in Hong Kong, Singapore, and Malaysia, have pursued a western life style and western values (such as individual freedom and democracy). In terms of cultural and ethnic affiliation, they have preferred to identify themselves with China—a great shift from their earlier refusal or denial of any ties with Communist China in the Cold War era. A growing sense of ties with China throughout the region is implicitly conducive to the expansion of China's influence. In contrast to the United States, which lost regional "respect" after several embarrassments (including the Guantanamo detention camp and the 2005 Katrina fiasco), China continued its confidence-building efforts. As a result, Kwa said, China enjoyed a more positive image of "benevolence" than the United States, despite greater U.S. assistance for tsunami relief.

Drafted by Sooyee Choi, Asia Program Assistant
Robert M. Hathaway, Director, Asia Program, Ph: (202) 691-4020