Religion is increasingly being mixed into the public space in Ukraine, according to Alexander Bogomolov, president, Association of Middle East Studies. Speaking at a recent Kennan Institute talk, Bogomolov focused on developments in Crimea, discussing how current tensions between the Islamic and Orthodox communities manifest themselves in local and national politics.

Bogomolov explored the historical roots of the present religious controversies in Crimea. In 1944, the Crimean Tatars were forcibly exiled from the region due to their alleged collaboration with the Nazis. They were sent mainly to Central Asia and other parts of the Soviet Union. They were eventually replaced largely by ethnic Russians, a visible and active minority of whom were military officers who had decided to retire to the area. Since the late 1980s, approximately 260,000 Crimean Tatars have returned to Crimea and they now constitute 12 percent of the peninsula's population. Bogomolov noted that the returning Tatars were not welcomed with open arms by the local authorities, although the federal government provided some limited financial support. In addition, he said that despite the emergence of a small Tatar middle class, many Tatars remain unsettled with limited access to housing, education, health care, and other social services.

Bogomolov stated that religion moved to the forefront of Crimean politics in the early 2000s, although this development was not accompanied by an upsurge of religious observance among the general population. Instead, politicians called on religion to provide greater legitimacy for their policies. In addition, several public monuments took on religious overtones. Bogomolov cited a recent memorial for the victims of Chernobyl that was consecrated with an Orthodox cross. Similarly, Tatar national monuments now include religious quotations from the Koran. According to Bogomolov, the construction of such monuments did not emanate from a deep religious conviction but rather from the desire to place the monument in a larger historical context, thereby giving the memorial greater meaning.

Bogomolov divided the main political actors behind the resurgence of religious activity in Crimea into two classes: religious groups/denominations, and social movements and political groups referring to faith identity. The religious groups included the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate); Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kyiv Patriarchate); Muftiyat (traditional Tatar Islam); and Islamic opposition groups. The prominent social groups included the Russian Community of Crimea ("ROK"), the Russian Movement of Ukraine, Ukrainian Cossacks, as well as other smaller fringe groups. Bogomolov paid particular attention to the perceived grievances of the Cossack movement, which he noted was not a continuation of the historic Cossacks but rather was a totally new social phenomenon that developed in the post-Soviet context and was inspired by myths of Cossack military glory. According to Bogomolov, Cossacks possess a largely unpublished "practical ideology" whereby they see themselves as the protectors of Orthodoxy. In addition, the Cossacks, ROK, and other Russian nationalist groups in Crimea share an apocalyptic vision of the future that views Muslims as a threat.

Bogomolov discussed the current function of religion in Crimean politics. As he noted, religion provides an element of authority that serves to legitimize actions by politicians and government officials. New identities have been forged: Slavic and Orthodox identities replaced Soviet identities, while for the Crimean Tatars, Muslim identity in some instances supplanted ethnic identity. These renewed religious identities led to conflict. For example, the Stone Cross Campaign of 2000-01 sought to commemorate 2000 years of Christianity by placing crosses on crossroads, hills, and other visible places. This provoked a strong negative reaction on the part of the local Tatar population. The most violent conflict to date was the Bakhchisarai conflict of August 2006, which centered on Crimean Tatar demands to move a marketplace located on Muslim holy ground. When the Tatars held a peaceful rally to press their demands, supporters of ROK and other nationalist groups attacked the Crimean Tatars.

According to Bogomolov, the power to prevent such clashes rests primarily with local governing bodies where the Crimean Tatars are under-represented. Attempts to appeal to national leaders have had only limited success. National leaders lack both the time and the political power to influence the local bodies, which remain extremely independent. Bogomolov concluded that it will take a long time before Ukrainian authorities fully appreciate the role that religion now plays in Crimean public life.