Japan's Political Mess: Abe Failed, Can Fukuda Do Better?

The speakers all agreed that one of the main reasons for former Prime Minister Abe's disastrous regime was a failure to connect with the electorate's primary concerns for social security and job creation issues. Rather, Abe stubbornly concentrated on constitutional, defense and education issues. By implication, the speakers felt that current Prime Minister Fukuda, and his Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), would be best served by focusing on those issues of primary concern to the electorate; otherwise, the opposition party, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), may well take over the government in the next election.

Robert Pekkanen, assistant professor at the University of Washington, addressed former Prime Minister Koizumi's legacy, noting that Koizumi's successful performance stemmed more from building on some fundamental structural changes in Japanese politics over the past decade rather than creating these trends himself. One of these trends is that the prime minister is now the face of the party. The media (especially television) reinforces this trend. Koizumi understood this very well, but Abe not so well. Pekkanen noted that additionally, Japanese ministers and cabinets are increasingly important to party success. Thus, appointing cabinet ministers is one of the most important jobs of a prime minister. Pekkanen dismissed the media and DPJ claims that factional politics have come back in the LDP with Prime Minister Fukuda, pointing out that while factions still exist, there is more internal democracy, factional leaders are weaker, and it is now transfactional alliances which win the day. Cabinets had traditionally been constructed based on factional balance, with competence being a secondary requirement. Koizumi made a "big deal" of choosing his cabinet on merit, even turning to non-legislators to fill positions. He seemed to be bucking all previous trends. Again, Abe was not so successful in this regard, but Fukuda is trying to continue Koizumi's legacy.

Shinju Fujihira, associate director of the program on U.S.-Japan studies at Harvard University, concentrated on the reasons for Abe's fall. He asserted that Abe's leadership style clashed with Japan's new political environment. Although Abe thought of himself as a fighting politician, he often fought for issues that were divisive. Abe devised the concept of Japan as a "beautiful" country, questioning its passive role in international affairs since World War II, and focusing on constitutional reforms related to defense issues. He also concentrated domestically on educational issues. The voters, however, were far more concerned with social security reform and job creation. Abe, according to Fujihira, failed to convince voters to change their priorities. For example, Abe said he would fight for the renewal of the anti-terrorism law, which allowed Japanese naval vessels to refuel allied ships engaged in the war in Afghanistan. It was a fight Abe could not win, according to Fujihira, because of the opposition of the DPJ, which after July controlled the upper house in the Japanese Diet (parliament). Yet Abe continued to fight on anyway. Overall, in Fujihira's estimation, it was clear that Abe was not as committed to economic issues as perhaps some of his predecessors.

Jun Saito, assistant professor at Franklin and Marshall College, focused on the role of the DPJ, noting that since that party now controls the upper house of the Diet, "the passage of legislation depends on them." Saito claimed the DPJ is not a radical party. It was formed by defectors from the other parties, and is itself a centrist coalition. He asserted there is very little difference ideologically between the DPJ and LDP, although the DPJ is more of a suburban-urban party, and the LDP more of a rural-urban party. He felt the keys to the DPJ's victory in last summer's upper house election were three-fold. First, Koizumi's reforms in local government encouraged the mergers of municipalities, which in turn radically reduced the numbers of municipal assemblymen, who were LDP activists. Secondly, the decline of the Japanese communist party (JCP) made the party uncompetitive in the upper house, leaving the field open to just the LDP and DPJ. Finally, the LDP's performance in the run-up to the elections was poor. It failed to contain its scandals, and in its slogan, "Make Growth Real," seemed to be cynically ignoring Japan's economic problems, particularly in the rural areas. Since the upper house is skewed toward rural areas, but the lower house is not, Saito stated that for the upcoming lower house elections, the DPJ needs to focus more on a strategy of winning over urban votes.

Sherry Martin, assistant professor at Cornell University, discussed the state of the Japanese electorate, particularly women. She
used her surveys and analysis of the 2005 Japanese lower house elections, under Koizumi, to shed light on the upper house elections of this summer. She noted that although some have claimed to see an emerging gender gap in the 2007 election, gender was not decisive in this instance because the electorate all across the board went against the LDP. However, in 2005, there was a significant gender gap in one particularly important category, unaffiliated voters. In a typical Japanese election, one quarter to one half of the electorate describe themselves as unaffiliated voters. In the 2005 election, 60 percent of unaffiliated men voted for the LDP, while only 35 percent of unaffiliated women did so. This meant that 65 percent of unaffiliated women voters cast their ballots for the DPJ, whereas only 40 percent of the men did so. Thus, even though Koizumi was popular with women, the 2005 election indicated a trend: unaffiliated women voters were more likely to favor the DPJ. This trend, asserted Martin, was undetected by the media, but bears watching in future elections.

Drafted by Mark Mohr, Asia Program Associate
Robert M. Hathaway, Director, Asia Program. Ph: (202) 691-4020