The virtually simultaneous collapse of the multinational communist states of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia has attracted considerable scholarly attention during the last decade. Whatever the exact focus of comparison, scholars generally agree that the striking contrast between the relatively peaceful disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia's bloody collapse is what needs to be explained. At a recent Kennan Institute and East European Studies event, Veljko Vujacic, Associate Professor of Sociology, Oberlin College, and Title VIII-Supported Research Scholar, East European Studies, provided an explanation of the contrast by illustrating the differences in the historical legacies of Russian and Serbian state and nation-building.

It is beyond dispute, Vujacic stated, that the reaction of the "dominant" nations—Russians and Serbs—to the prospect of state disintegration was one of the most important factors in determining the difference in outcomes. While Russian democratic elites accepted the borders between Soviet republics as the borders between internationally recognized states, Serbs challenged analogous borders in Yugoslavia. This divergence, he noted, has to do with critical differences between Russian and Serbian perceptions of the state, which, as he demonstrated, have deep historical roots.

One critical element of that difference is the Russians' imperial identity, which, Vujacic contended, historically contributed to the blurring of ethnic boundaries between Russians and other ethnic groups (especially Ukrainians and Belarusians, but also other Russian-speakers), and the historical absence of a Russian "diaspora" question. By contrast, he argued, Serbian nation-building occurred in the context of opposition to imperial domination and with the goal of incorporating the ethnic diaspora into the emerging nation-state. The existence of a Serbian nation-state prior to Yugoslav unification meant that Serbs could retain a stronger sense of national particularism in Yugoslavia than Russians in the Russian empire or the Soviet Union.

Vujacic also addressed the differences in the internal dynamic of state-society relations for Russians and Serbs. He claimed that the patrimonial features of Russian autocracy, which were partially revived by Stalin in the context of a totalitarian state, made for, at best, an ambivalent or, at worst, a "negative" identification of Russians with the state. The traumatic legacy of Stalinism revived the perception of the state as an alien force in opposition to the "real" Russia of the suffering people. By contrast, Serbs identified with both the Serbian and Yugoslav states in a manifestly positive manner. "A positive identification between the nation and state characterizes nation-states," he stated, "while geographically contiguous empires of the Russian type rely on the loyalty of multi-ethnic elites, and reject popular sovereignty as a matter of principle." As a result, he added, the identification between national culture and the state that characterizes nation-states failed to develop in the Russian case.

Although these perceptions of the state were an integral part of the political cultures of the two nations well before the communist period, Vujacic put forth that they were reinforced by the different historical experiences of Russians and Serbs under communism. The institutional arrangements of communist federalism in each state reflected their historical state- and nation-building experiences. Unlike Russians, Serbs were given their own cultural and political institutions in communist Yugoslavia. The lack of overlap between Serbian and Yugoslav institutions was explicitly designed to underscore the fact that Serbs would not be allowed to become a Russian-style "elder brother." This institutional separation between "Serbia" and "Yugoslavia" had an additional and important unintended consequence: it meant that Serbian national particularism was placed on an institutional foundation. In political terms, the presence of republic-wide institutions—from the communist party organization to republic-wide media and cultural institutions—was significant because it meant that leaders like Slobodan Milosevic could make use of ready-made institutions for the purpose of nationalist mobilization. By contrast, both Russian counterparts of Milosevic and Russian democrats had to create Russian institutions from scratch.

While these broad differences in political-cultural and institutional legacies partially explain the discrepancy between outcomes in Russia and Serbia, Vujacic argued that a full explanation requires paying attention to a number of contextual factors that favored "the selective reactivation" of elements of those legacies by cultural and political elites. For instance, one such factor in the Yugoslav case was the Kosovo crisis, which touched on the very core of the Serbian national myth and provided Serbian nationalism with a concrete grievance in the 1980s. "The specific ways in which leaders like Milosevic and Boris Yeltsin made use of the institutional crises of their respective multinational states, by combining appeals to the nation with other concerns (economic reform, social justice, and aspirations for political participation on the part of critical constituencies), in part reflected different historical legacies of state and nation-building in Russia and Serbia, and in part helped shape mass perceptions in the period of the terminal crisis of communism," Vujacic asserted.

In concluding, Vujacic reiterated that the fundamentally different attitude toward the state constitutes just one among a whole set of ideological, institutional, and contextual factors that influenced political outcomes in the late Communist period. "However, it is precisely this political-cultural element that explains the appeals and actions of leaders, intellectual elites, and their followers in Russia and Serbia," he stated. Only a multi-factorial explanation that takes into account the interaction between political-cultural and institutional legacies and contextual factors—including leadership—can offer a satisfactory solution to the puzzle of different outcomes in Russia and Serbia.

Written by Sarah Dixon Klump