On February 18, Pakistanis voted in parliamentary elections. The results were a major blow to President Pervez Musharraf and his supporters. Opposition parties, led by the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), and a resurgent Awami National Party (ANP), scored major victories. The prime losers were the ruling Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid (PML-Q) and Islamists. How can these elections be assessed, and what do they portend for Pakistan's future and for U.S. policy? These questions were examined at an Asia Program event held one week after the elections.

Eric Bjornlund, who organized a 38-member U.S. election observation team, reported what he saw on February 18. He described the election process as "surprisingly encouraging." Election day was relatively peaceful, went smoothly, and benefited from a "very prominent" security presence. As a result, and contrary to widespread expectations, Pakistanis enjoyed a genuine opportunity "to freely express their will" at the ballot box. According to Bjornlund, there was a "general acceptance" that the election results reflected public sentiment. On the other hand, the pre-election environment suffered from "serious flaws," ranging from the state of emergency invoked last year to widespread violence and restrictions on media. He warned that such flaws, if not addressed, may pose future obstacles to democratization in Pakistan.

Hassan Abbas argued that the electorate issued a "clear verdict" against "Musharraf and [the] mullahs." He attributed the PML-N's success in Punjab province (home to a majority of Pakistan's voters) to the insistence of its leader, Nawaz Sharif, that the supreme court justices suspended by Musharraf be reinstated. Meanwhile, Islamists were trounced because "they hadn't shown anything concrete" to voters. However, Abbas pointed out that despite these transformations in Pakistan's political scene, the army's clout remains intact. He recalled how Pakistan's new army chief, Gen. Ashfaq Kiyani, had told reporters that his institution would promote free and fair elections and would not rig them—an outcome that was for the most part attained. "When the Pakistan army wants to do something, it delivers," Abbas concluded.

Hasan-Askari Rizvi declared February 18 a major success for Pakistan's democratic forces—but insisted that a battle is still playing out between partisans of democracy and authoritarianism. Nonetheless, the elections have made two major imprints on Pakistani politics. The "highly centralized" system built around a single individual has "crumbled." And the role of Islamic parties will now revert to that of previous years—when Islamists were relevant to the political process not as core members of the governing coalition, but instead as "a pressure group" that obtained "a few seats here and there." This new dynamic, Rizvi stated, presents an opportunity to create "a new viable political order." However, he warned that doing so will not be easy, given the tensions between Pakistan's slow-to-act leaders and impatient "societal groups" that seek immediate changes.

Marvin Weinbaum, who was a member of the election observer mission, depicted the election as a watershed moment in Pakistan's history: elections have provided for the first democratic constitutional transfer of power. Yet for all the fanfare about the seminal nature of the elections, he pointed out that voters' desires were quite simple: they wanted an end to the country's wheat and energy shortages. Weinbaum ventured some guesses as to which politicians will benefit most from the balloting results. There is "no doubt," he contended, that the PPP's Asif Zardari (widower of the late Benazir Bhutto) is "grooming himself" to become prime minister. However, it is Sharif, the leader of a faction of a split party that could soon unify, who will "inherit the democratic wind." Regardless of what happens, Weinbaum noted, we must hope that political parties "won't give democracy a black eye" as they did in the 1990s.

How will Pakistan's elections impact U.S. policy, and particularly the war on terror? Panelists agreed that both Islamabad's new political leadership and the army might alter their policies vis-à-vis extremism. Rizvi predicted that, because it will be moderate, the new governing coalition will attempt a dialogue with jihadists, while Abbas mused that if the army continues to be the target of suicide attacks, it may reassess its counterterrorism strategies. Yet ultimately, according to Weinbaum, Pakistanis will not support the war on terror so long as they perceive it to be merely "an American project." American meddling in Pakistan's affairs intensifies this perception. And an example of this meddling is Washington's stubborn support for the deeply unpopular Musharraf, which has continued even after his party was humbled at the polls last week. Rizvi warned that unless it encourages him to resign, the U.S. government will alienate both the Pakistani people and its new leadership.


Drafted by Michael Kugelman, Asia Program Associate
Robert M. Hathaway, Director, Asia Program, Ph: (202) 691-4020