Why U.S. Allies Saudi Arabia and Israel Are Looking Beyond Obama

As changes unfold in Saudi Arabia and Israel, it increasingly appears that Jerusalem and Riyadh may be looking beyond this administration. (We don’t care about Obama; we care about Washington, former Saudi diplomat Abdullah al-Shammari was recently quoted as saying.) It’s ironic that as the Middle East devolves and the U.S. needs friends in the region–regardless of their imperfections–relations between Washington and its two oldest allies are so strained.

There are many reasons for the upset, but the most important is Washington’s emerging relationship with Iran. And right now, it looks unlikely that the U.S. can balance relations between its new friend and its old ones.

U.S. relations with Israel and Saudi Arabia emerged at roughly the same time during the 1940s, when the United States began to fill the power vacuum left by a declining British empire in the post-World War II Middle East. Each relationship would become special in its own way: one based on the need to protect access to Saudi oil and stability in the Persian Gulf; the other driven by support for a Jewish state in the wake of the Nazi genocide and what would increasingly be seen as shared values and interests with the region’s only democracy. Over the years there were significant tensions in both relationships, but more predictability and consistency were demonstrated than change.

Shifts in the Middle East have produced unprecedented stresses in both relationships. The Arab Spring, particularly the fall of Hosni Mubarak and perceptions that the Obama administration had facilitated his ouster, alienated the stability-driven Saudis. Growing tensions between the Netanyahu government and the Obama administration on settlements and the peace process strained U.S.-Israeli ties.

But it was the perception–and reality–that the Obama administration was reaching out to Tehran that has reframed Israeli and Saudi views of U.S. policies. Israel and Saudi Arabia had stakes in checking Iran’s nuclear weapons potential. But as the nuclear negotiations unfolded it became clear that while Iran’s nuclear capacity might be slowed, it would not be ended; and that once out from under sanctions Iran would probably have the best of both worlds: a residual and sizeable nuclear infrastructure and billions from sanctions relief, trade, and unfrozen assets to fund its campaign to extend its influence into Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and now Yemen. The U.S. logic that no deal might lead to an acceleration of Iran’s nuclear program, even break out to a bomb, mattered little to smaller powers in a turbulent neighborhood watching a rising Tehran expand its reach.

Saudi Arabia and Israel, while still dependent on U.S. support, have decided to further their own interests. Recent changes introduced by the new Saudi leader, King Salman, reflect the rise of two princely anti-Iranian hawks charged with countering Tehran’s influence in the region. Other signals: The kingdom is sending billions in economic aid to the Sisi governmentat a time when U.S.-Egyptian ties are stressed and continuing the air campaign it has led against the Houthis in Yemen when Washington wants political negotiations. In Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu, still fuming over the likely nuclear deal he can’t stop, is forming a narrow, right-wing government that all but ensures more tensions are coming with Washington on settlements and the peace process. Hints by the Obama administration that the U.S. could seek a U.N. Security Council resolution endorsing a political framework on a two-state solution reflects the growing divide between Jerusalem and Washington.

The administration’s view that Iran may hold the key to stability on the nuclear issue, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen has opened a divide with traditional allies who see things quite differently. As the administration looks more and more toward Iran, Israel and Saudi Arabia will look beyond Barack Obama–-biding their time, furthering their own agendas, and hoping that the next president, regardless of party, will see Tehran in a different light.

The opinions expressed here are solely those of the author.

This article was originally published in The Wall Street Journal's Washington Wire.