Part III: “We attacked them with chemical weapons and they attacked us with chemical weapons”: Iraqi Records and the History of Iran’s Chemical Weapons Program
The third and final installment of a three-part article addressing the legacy of chemical weapons use in the Iran-Iraq War and Iran’s chemical weapons program. The article focuses on the history of and lingering debate about Iran’s chemical weapons program and allegations of limited battlefield use.
As a result of the 2003 US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq, US forces seized somewhere in the range of 100-200 million pages of paper documents, along with tapes containing thousands of hours of audio recordings and video footage from the regime of Saddam Hussein and his ruling Baʿth Party. The records were gathered by special Document Exploitation (Doc-Ex) units and triaged in the search for evidence of Iraq’s reconstituted weapons of mass destruction programs, ties to al-Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden, war crimes, and violations of the United Nations sanctions regime leveled on Iraq between 1990 and 2003. The search produced a large volume of evidence for the latter two categories, but little for the first two, which were the primary justifications for the war given by the administration of President George W. Bush.
In addition to efforts to exploit the documents for any intelligence value in confronting the growing insurgency against the US occupation of Iraq, the US Department of Defense sponsored several after-action retrospective studies, drawing on interviews with Iraqi military and political officials as well. While the most immediate interest was Saddam’s perceptions of the United States, along with understanding the Iraqi military perspective of conflict with the United States in 1991 and 2003, it soon became clear that the records had analytical and historical value for a much wider range of topics. The 1990-2003 conflict between Saddam’s regime and the United States, bracketed by two decisive but short wars, was undoubtedly the most fateful for the Iraqi dictator. However, the 1980-1988 war with neighboring Iran was a much longer conventional conflict.
As such, the captured Iraqi records and interviews with Iraqi participants have proven valuable for presenting a fuller history of not only the Iran-Iraq War, but also in terms of shedding light of Iraqi perceptions of Iran and Iranian military capabilities.
The Iranian Enemy through the Eyes and Ears of Iraqi Military Intelligence
Iraqi records detailing several instances of Iran’s battlefield use of chemical weapons, along with what intelligence the Iraqis were able to gather on Iranian efforts to build their chemical weapons program with foreign assistance, continue to be relevant. Remarkably, at the time Saddam ordered the invasion of Iran in September 1980, the General Military Intelligence Directorate had only three officers dedicated to gathering intelligence on Iran. Williamson Murray and Kevin M. Woods explained, “the Iraqis had little ability to assess Iranian military capabilities or operations beyond the information their attaches reported from the embassy in Tehran.” Possessing only a handful of Persian speakers, Iraqi military intelligence had several sections staffed with Hebrew speakers assigned to study the Israeli military. The failure of Iraq to secure a rapid victory against Iran altered this allocation of resources. By 1986, Iraqi military intelligence had nearly eighty officers supported by 2,500 non-commissioned officers and enlisted men working on intelligence related to Iran. “The most important advantage the Iraqis enjoyed throughout the conflict was in the realm of signals intelligence,” noted Murray and Woods. As a result of these developments spurred by wartime necessity, Iraqi intelligence on Iran improved, producing a considerable volume of documentation as a result.
Some scholars who have studied the subject of Iranian chemical weapons for decades, such as Jean Pascal Zanders, have been more skeptical of the Iraqi records and the information they contain. Zanders writes that “even if the veracity of these reports can be ascertained, a few munitions do not make a warfare capacity.” Going on, Zanders explains, “the more recent information from Iraqi intelligence documents may add some texture, but do not yet challenge the conclusions reached in 2001.” In contrast to Zanders, Michael Eisenstadt writes that “because these were highly classified internal documents intended to inform Iraqi forces of enemy capabilities, and were not intended for public consumption, they deserve greater attention than they have received to date.”
Following up on Eisenstadt’s suggestion, this article is informed by the fullest extent possible of relevant Harmony Database records that were previously available at the Conflict Records Research Center. Although many records overlap or contain duplicate pages, this author was able to identify 14 distinct files, consisting of nearly 300 pages of documents.
Like any source, the Iraqi records should be approached cautiously and critically. B.H. Lidell Hart’s warning that “nothing can deceive like a document” remains timely. However, the Iraqi records are as revealing in terms of the claims they contain as they are with respect to those one might expect to find but are missing. Absent is any attempt to attribute Iranian responsibility for the gassing of Halabja or claim that Iran was the first to use chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq War. With respect to Halabja, the only relatively close claimed instance of Iranian chemical weapons use, both geographically and temporally, was twenty mustard gas shells fired at the 34th Division on March 30, 1988, more than two weeks after the gassing of Halabja. In this regard at least, internal Iraqi documents are consistent with what Iraqi officials told the United Nations investigative team that visited Iraq in April 1988.
Scholars who have studied Iraq’s conduct of its war with Iran, along with those skeptical of claims regarding Iran’s development and use of chemical weapons, have noted the many instances where Iraq accidentally gassed its own troops, wind blew gas back across Iraqi positions, leaking munitions, and mishaps loading chemical bombs onto warplanes. In light of only several detailed claims of Iran’s use of the weapons compared to Iraq’s regular use, it seems safe to assume Iraq suffered far more casualties over the course of the war due to its own chemical weapons than it did Iran’s. As has been seen, former Iraqi generals have acknowledged Iraqi casualties from Iraq’s own chemical weapons. And in keeping with much of the scholarship on the subject, the possibility of Iran’s use of captured Iraqi chemical shells is noted in the Iraqi intelligence documents.
However, testing on a captured Iranian shell taken to al-Muthanna Chemical Complex revealed it to contain sulfuric mustard agent with component levels different from the mustard gas shells Iraq was manufacturing. While the United Nations team’s study of the same mortar shells was inconclusive, even if skeptical of Iraqi claims, assessed together with the Iraqi intelligence report, it presents a picture of potential experimentation with chemical mortar rounds on the part of Iran. With the acknowledgement of the limited scale of Iran’s use of chemical weapons to date, Iraqi intelligence concluded that Iran was moving toward more extensive use of locally-produced mustard gas mortar shells, noting “the case mentioned above is solid proof of the possession and use of poisonous chemical agents by the enemy against our troops, which requires emphasizing to our troops compliance with the procedures issued in our top secret letter of October 19, 1987 and carrying protective gear at all times.”
The Rumors of War: What Do the Iraqi Records Reveal?
Proliferation concerns have been prominent on the agendas of Western policymakers for decades. Some might be surprised to learn that Iraqi officials and their intelligence services had their own version of these concerns as the conflict with Iran devolved into a protracted war of attrition.
The Iran-North Korea Connection
An early subject of interest for Iraqi intelligence was friendly relations between Iran and North Korea. As Iraq’s chemical warfare escalated against Iranian troops, Iranian-North Korean relations became a feared conduit for the proliferation of chemical weapons. Some of the human intelligence on the subject could be justifiably described as rumors. In March 1984, the Iraqi military attaché in Delhi wrote that two sources stated a shipment of mustard gas from North Korea was destined for Iran by way of China and Pakistan. Another source, an Egyptian brigadier general studying at the Indian National Defense College, reported that “he was assured that it is intelligence information.”
Iraqi intelligence fears of chemical weapons proliferation between North Korea and Iran extended into the former’s relations with the Soviet Union. As outlandish as these fears may seem, they appear to find a potential corroboration in the memoir of US President Barack Obama, who in describing the conflict between Iran and Iraq, wrote that it was “a war in which the Gulf States provided Saddam Hussein with financing while the Soviets supplied Khomeini’s military with arms, including chemical weapons.”
In any event, in March 1987, the South Korean military attaché informed Iraqi intelligence that the Soviet Union was going to supply North Korea with “a set amount of poison gases.” The memorandum went on to describe the threat of delivering sarin nerve gas with missiles, likely reflecting awareness to Iranian-North Korean cooperation on ballistic missile technology. North Korean and Chinese assistance with Iran’s surface-to-surface ballistic missile program would continue to be monitored by Iraqi intelligence following the end of the war with Iran, foreshadowing US concerns with Iran’s ballistic missile program that still exist today.
Reports of North Korean assistance with Iran’s chemical weapons program grew with increased attention paid to the subject by Iraqi intelligence. On April 14, 1987, sources reported that Iran had obtained materials for mustard gas and Tabun nerve agent from North Korea, North Korean experts were helping the Iranians inside Iran, and that small-scale weapons tests were being conducted in Mashhad and Iranshahr.
Iran’s Other Chemical Weapons Suppliers: The Two Germanys and Syria
Another Iraqi intelligence assessment noted that the North Koreans were not alone in assisting the Iranian chemical weapons program. Listing Bushehr, Damghan and al-Razi as the most important locations and facilities for nine facilities in total dedicated to the program, the Iranians reportedly benefited from North Korean, West German, East German, Swiss, Swedish, Spanish, Syrian, Chilean, and even Israeli help. (Although the claim of Israeli help for Iran’s chemical weapons program may sound fantastical or even conspiratorial, it is not without comparable examples in the public record. In 1998, expatriate Israeli businessman Nahum Manbar was sentenced to sixteen years in jail for selling poison gas materials and equipment to Iran between 1990 and 1994.)
Indeed, the more consistent and official assistance came from Iran’s political and commercial allies. Iran’s Marvdasht Petrochemicals Plant benefitted from West German, East German, and Syrian help. The Iraqi military attaché in Moscow reported that the plant was similar to the Syrian one in al-Hasakah. A February 18-19, 1984, explosion at the Marvdasht plant reportedly killed Syrian and East German experts. It would not be the last such incident in the field of chemical weapons cooperation between Iran and Syria. In September 2007, dozens of Iranian engineers and fifteen Syrian officers were killed in an accident while reportedly attempting to mount a warhead containing Sarin nerve gas onto a Scud missile. Iran and Syria’s chemical weapons programs may have benefited one another, with Iraqi intelligence observing that nerve and mustard gas were produced at Syria’s Tishrin Lab. Potentially connected to the mustard gas shells that turned up in Libya in 2011 and 2012, Iran’s Barjin factory was believed to be producing artillery shells that could be modified to hold gas.
Although the division of labor between the two Germanys generally involved West German corporations and East German expertise on the ground, the West Germans also had a direct presence in Iran. Another Iraqi document states that “the enemy’s chemical weapons experts from West Germany are helping in the production of chemical agents” and that “the Iranian enemy benefitted from the Libyan regime’s experience in obtaining German experts” (a reference to what may have been another area of cooperation between Iran and Libya).
The same report details plans for a West German company based in Frankfurt, along with a Spanish company, to build a chemical plant in Tehran. Central Intelligence Agency and Defense Intelligence Agency officers appear to have discussed international efforts to interdict the sale of dual-use chemical materials and technology to Iran with their Iraqi counterparts, as the record states: “based on intelligence from the American Intelligence Service, the Dutch police have confiscated barrels full of weapons and chemical solutions estimated to weigh seven tons at the port of Rotterdam.” It may have not been lost on Iraqi intelligence that Rotterdam was a transit point for chemical weapons precursors bound for both Iran and Iraq, with ties to US companies in each case.
While the Iraqis closely followed the English language media and open-source intelligence reports, it is not always clear what they made of intelligence shared with them by their American counterparts. In another record, they compare information on Iranian military capabilities provided by the Americans with their own, noting the points of overlap and where they differ. Given Saddam’s deep distrust and suspicion of the United States, it is possible these dispositions manifested down the chain of command and into the realm of US-Iraqi intelligence cooperation.
All intelligence, especially human intelligence, should be subjected to close examination and scrutiny. Nevertheless, one area where Iraq’s intelligence was likely particularly strong was on the European commercial landscape for purchasing the components and expertise required for building a chemical weapons program. After all, in this regard, Iran was following Iraq’s lead in its “constant effort to obtain raw materials from European countries.” Undoubtedly aware of this dynamic, after describing an offer made by a German company to provide chemical protective equipment, one report notes that “the Iranian enemy is likely to receive the same offers.” However, Iran was at a disadvantage in that Iraq’s growing use of chemical weapons resulted in the first official US condemnation in 1984 and tougher chemical export restrictions. The resulting obstacles facing Iran were not a concern for Iraq, which built its own program on the open market between 1980 and 1984. One Iraqi record contains a copy of the US State Department document detailing the restrictions.
Iran, working primarily out of its embassy in West Germany, in turn used front companies in a manner similar to Iraq and Libya in a bid to work through the same network of suppliers. Iran’s effort extended as far as trying to obtain chemicals through Alcolac International of Baltimore. Following the breaking of this story in 1989, additional reporting highlighted the role of western European firms in facilitating the Syrian, Iraqi, Libyan, and Iranian chemical weapons programs. The Iranian regime has routinely reminded German officials of the role German companies played in building Iraq’s chemical weapons program, although has not acknowledged that many of the same companies helped build Iran’s own program.
Iranian Chemical Weapons Usage on the Battlefield
With respect to the instances where Iran used chemical weapons against Iraqi troops, the Iraqi records are remarkably detailed for what ultimately amounted to a limited number of battlefield cases. The December 1986 intelligence assessment noted that Iran had no effective “locally” produced chemical weapons and could produce only small amounts of mustard agent. Iran appeared to make breakthroughs in 1987. Prior to April 1987, the Iranians used CS tear gas against Iraqi positions on at least four occasions, the first taking place in 1983. Perhaps alarmed by these incidents or due to more numerous accidents involving its own gas, the Iraqi military conducted a drill, gassing one of its own regiments on June 27, 1985, in “an attempt to overcome the psychological barrier of chemical agent exposure impact that has been circulating amongst the soldiers and may possibly be used by the enemy.”
Between April 9, 1987 and May 28, 1988, Iraqi intelligence recorded six Iranian attacks using mustard gas, one using phosgene gas, one using an unidentified gas, and several more using CS tear gas. The Iraqi 3rd Corps also captured 141 81-millimeter mortar shells containing mustard gas, which were later presented to the visiting United Nations team. In light of these developments, the sober-minded assessment read that “the produced quantities of chemical agents mentioned above are still limited, which could be the result of the lack of raw materials used in production or the lack of ammunition casings used in filling.” Furthermore, according to the report, “the enemy was incapable of storing large quantities of ammunition near the launching equipment, fearing the impact of our air power and artillery bombing.”
Irrespective of the localized nature of these events within a massive war, news about them quickly reached the top of Saddam’s regime, which possessed an obvious political interest in the subject. In the captured audio recording of a meeting between Saddam and his advisers discussing the United Nations resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire on July 19, 1987, one unidentified speaker exclaims: “The resolution will not be balanced. We cannot say that only we were being attacked. I mean there are some issues; we attacked them with chemical weapons and they attacked us with chemical weapons. There is no problem there.” Saddam’s deputy Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri added: “We will also argue about the chemical attacks. We say that you [the Iranians] also attacked us. We can bring eyewitnesses and evidence to them.”
The level of attention paid to Iranian efforts to obtain chemical protective gear may very well have been a projection of Iraq’s own offensive chemical weapons doctrine. This was especially the case in the final years of the war, when Iraqi infantry in chemical suits routinely advanced on Iranian positions immediately after chemical munitions were used. Iraqi intelligence made note of the Iranian embassy in Bonn arranging for the purchase of gas masks from the West German company Drager. The Iranians also reportedly purchased gas masks from Israel and protective chemical suits from England, with a French company also offering to sell gas masks. Soviet-made protective gear transferred to Iran from Syria additionally allowed the Iranian military to upgrade its defensive capabilities, forming special units for the purpose of decontamination.
Iraqi intelligence reports on this subject implicitly underscore the immense scale of Iraq’s chemical warfare against Iran, even if they fail to detail it in writing. An interrogation report from an Iranian prisoner of war revealed a high level of training and preparedness, with a chemical group and officer in each battalion, a chemical regiment in each division, and a chemical warrant officer in each regiment. No modern military had been gassed as frequently and intensively as Iran’s. Following the end of the Iran-Iraq war, the integration of the lessons learned from Iraqi chemical warfare into Iranian military doctrine made it difficult for Iraqi, US, and Israeli intelligence to tell whether Iranian chemical weapons exercises were defensive, offensive, or included components of both.
During the war, and especially once Iran developed its limited chemical warfare capabilities, the Iraqis undoubtedly feared the threatened retaliation for their widescale use of chemical weapons against Iranian forces, along with civilians in Western Iran. Iraq had reason to be nervous in that the war’s frontlines were always much closer to its capital and major urban centers. One dire assessment stated, “The enemy is likely to use chemical weapons against Iraqi cities, especially Baghdad.”
In the period after the Iran-Iraq War, Iraqi intelligence reflected on the legacies of chemical warfare. In one blunt assessment, Iraqi officials said that “in recent years people started talking a lot about the use of chemical weapons in war, and many efforts were focused to prevent and stop their production in vain because these kinds of weapons cost little and their technology is simple.” Elsewhere, this report quickly drifts away from honesty, reading: “During the last war between Iran and Iraq, both sides used chemical weapons in a limited way in which their effects were not harmful to either, based on the understanding that desperate times call for desperate measures.” As transparently false as it was to compare Iran’s chemical weapons program and limited use with Iraq’s extensive usage of the weapon, it was an equivalency Saddam’s regime had an interest in perpetuating. Both in their private discussions and official statements for the sake of international public opinion, they sought to capitalize on the Islamic Republic of Iran’s isolation and pariah status to create false perceptions and sow confusion on who was using chemical weapons against whom, which eerily foreshadowed similar events in Syria since 2012.
As this article has sought to illustrate though, Iraqi records, if read critically, can still serve as valuable sources for the history of Iran’s efforts to build its chemical weapons program in response to Iraq’s chemical warfare, along with its breakthrough and limited use of chemical weapons against Iraq on the battlefield in 1987 and 1988. Given Iran’s limitations and perhaps fearing an even larger Iraqi chemical escalation, it is possible that the Iranian leadership ultimately chose to fall back on the official narrative of Islamic and moral opposition to using chemical weapons, determining they had higher trade value to Libya for mines or Scud-B missiles, which were deemed to be of greater military value for the Iranian war effort.
With the passing of time, Iraqi intelligence reported fewer details about Iran’s chemical weapons program. Dated May 31, 2001, one report on Iran’s military capabilities states, “Iran possesses the capability of manufacturing and delivering chemical weapons… Some production lines could be assigned to serve the production of chemical weapons, such as nerve gas, phosgene, mustard, sarin, CS, and phosphorous.” On the question of biological weapons, the report notes, “the manufacturing of these weapons by Iran is not confirmed.” Looking back at the Iran-Iraq War, it reads, “the war demonstrated the limited capabilities of the Iranian enemy concerning using chemical agents, mustard, CS, and the launch of artillery, some light launchers, and mortars.”
Indeed, read together with the other Iraqi records on the subject, a consistent picture emerges that challenges Iran’s official narrative on the history of its chemical weapons program. As such, they constitute valuable historical sources that provide the most detailed information to date, in light of the lack of access to internal Iranian sources on the subject. Their confirmation of Iran’s export of mustard gas shells and bombs to Libya, which were in turn used in Chad, constitutes a major piece of evidence in a case that demonstrates the danger of chemical weapons proliferation and use. Furthermore, this incident and the totality of the Iraqi records about Iran’s chemical weapons program and procurement efforts, should encourage Western policymakers to be as critical audiences to Iran’s official statements on the subject as they are of those about its nuclear program today.
 Kevin M. Woods, Michael R. Pease, Mark E. Stout, Williamson Murray, and James G. Lacey, The Iraqi Perspectives Report: Saddam’s Senior Leadership on Operation Iraqi Freedom from the Official U.S. Joint Forces Command Report (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2006).
 Kevin M. Woods, David D. Palkki, and Mark E. Stout (eds.), The Saddam Tapes: The Inner Workings of a Tyrant’s Regime 1978-2001 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
 Kevin M. Woods, Williamson Murray, and Thomas Holaday, “Saddam’s War: An Iraqi Military Perspective of the Iran-Iraq War,” McNair Paper 70, Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University, 2009, Kevin M. Woods, Williamson Murray, Elizabeth A. Nathan, Laila Sabara, and Ana M. Venegas, Saddam’s Generals: Perspectives of the Iran-Iraq War (Alexandria, Virginia: Institute for Defense Analyses, 2011), and Williamson Murray and Kevin M. Woods, The Iran-Iraq War: A Military and Strategic History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014).
 Murray and Woods, The Iran-Iraq War, 70.
 CRRC, SH-GMID-D-000-863, “General Military Intelligence Directorate Reports on Iranian Chemical Weapons,” August 1987-July 1988.
 Joost R. Hiltermann, A Poisonous Affair: America, Iraq, and the Gassing of Halabja (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 158, 166-168, and Javed Ali, “Chemical Weapons and the Iran-Iraq War: A Case Study in Noncompliance,” The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 8, No. 1 (2001), 48.
 Woods, Murray, Nathan, Sabara, and Venegas, Saddam’s Generals, 47-49.
 CRRC, SH-GMID-D-000-863.
 CRRC, SH-GMID-D-000-863.
 CRRC, SH-GMID-D-001-429, “Memorandum from GMID to Military Attaches in Islamabad, Ankara, and New Delhi Relating to Technical Assistance Provided by North Korea,” December 18, 1982.
 CRRC, SH-GMID-D-000-154, “Telegrams sent from the Iraqi Military Attaché in Delhi Concerning Chemical and Germ Warfare Equipment and Previous Mustard Gas Shipments from North Korea to Iran in 1984,” March 1984.
 Barack Obama, A Promised Land (New York: Crown, 2020), 452.
 CRRC, SH-GMID-D-000-233, “Iraqi Embassy Letter to General Military Intelligence Directorate Regarding Poison Gases that were shipped to North Korea by the Soviet Union,” March 31, 1987.
 CRRC, SH-MODX-D-001-291, “A 1992 Report on Iranian Efforts to Obtain Nuclear Weapons after the Collapse of the Soviet Union,” March 31, 1992.
 CRRC, SH-GMID-D-001-125, “General Military Intelligence Directorate Correspondence about Iranian Use of Chemical Weapons on Iraqi Troops on the Battlefield,” April 14, 1987.
 CRRC, SH-GMID-D-000-579.
 CRRC, SH-GMID-D-000-898.
 CRRC, SH-GMID-D-000-579.
 For a useful treatment of this historical phenomenon with respect to Iraq and Syria, see Massimiliano Trentin, “’Tough negotiations’: The two Germanys in Syria and Iraq, 1963-74,” Cold War History, Vol. 8, No. 3 (August 2008), 353-380.
 CRRC, SH-MISC-D-000-959.
 CRRC, SH-IDGS-D-000-854, “Reports by the General Security Intelligence Directorate to the Deputy Directorate Regarding a Study Presented by the American Military Attaché in Baghdad Detailing Iranian Military Capabilities,” December 1986-March 1988.
 CRRC, SH-GMID-D-000-898.
 CRRC, SH-MISC-D-000-959.
 CRRC, SH-GMID-D-000-863.
 This observation is made in Dany Shoham, “Image vs. Reality of Iranian Chemical and Biological Weapons,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Vol. 18, No. 1 (2005), 128.
 CRRC, SH-GMID-D-001-125.
 CRRC, SH-GMID-D-000-863.
 CRRC, SH-MODX-D-001-430, “Experimental Chemical Attack on June 27, 1985,” June 27, 1985.
 CRRC, SH-GMID-D-000-863.
 Woods, Palkki, and Stout, The Saddam Tapes, 153-154.
 Although less related to their respective chemical weapons programs, England appears to have been another theater of commercial operations and competition for both Iran and Iraq. Official British policy at the time was one of neutrality in the Iran-Iraq War and it sought to promote business with both countries. Iran’s extensive use of Iranian Military Procurement Offices (IMPOs) appear to have been highly valuable for arranging arms purchases and obtaining spare parts for the Iranian military. See Daniel Salisbury, “Arming Iran from the heart of Westminster? The Iranian military procurement offices, rumours, and intelligence, 1981-1987,” Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 35, No. 7 (2020), 1042-1058.
 CRRC, SH-MISC-D-000-959.
 Giles, “The Islamic Republic of Iran and Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons,” 93-98.
 CRRC, SH-MISC-D-000-959.
 CRRC, SH-GMID-D-000-844, “Information about the Iranian Ability to Produce Missiles and a Secret Study Titled the Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats in the Middle East Area,” Date Unknown.
 CRRC, SH-AFGC-D-001-168, “Study About the Military Capabilities of Iran,” May 31, 2001.
About the Author
Michael P. Brill is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University, where his research focuses on Ba'thist Iraq.Read More
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