Ukraine Quarterly Digest: January–March 2023

Despite ongoing hostilities during the first quarter of 2023, Russian forces did not make much progress on the battlefield. Indeed, the Russian army continued suffering heavy casualties, in part because troops were provided with obsolete weapons. Meanwhile, Western states committed to providing Ukraine with more modern military equipment, including heavy tanks, and began training Ukrainian forces in their use. But Ukraine needs still more weapons to conduct successful counteroffensive operations to liberate the occupied territories.

Lacking battlefield success, Russia continued air attacks on Ukraine’s power system, which survived, and the country has experienced few power cutoffs since February. Russia also pursued its hybrid war in other dimensions, resorting to blackmail, threats, cyberattacks, and informational and psychological operations.

Russian criminal behavior in the occupied territories prompted the International Criminal Court in March to issue a warrant of arrest for Vladimir Putin, allegedly responsible for the war crime of unlawful deportation of children from the occupied areas of Ukraine to Russia. The European Court of Human Rights also recognized Russia’s responsibility for unlawfully occupying areas in eastern Ukraine since May 2014.

Western leaders and top officials, including U.S. president Joe Biden, visited Kyiv to reaffirm support.

1. ROLLOUT OF THE WAR

General War Developments during January–March
During the first quarter of 2023, the configuration of the front did not change much. Russian forces have been pressuring the eastern regions since the beginning of the year, advancing on four fronts. In early 2023 the Kremlin proposed a ceasefire for Orthodox Christmas. Kyiv did not trust the proffered truce, and Russia itself violated its own proposal.

In late February, when the country entered the second year of the full-scale war, many in Ukraine and abroad expected a new wave of attacks and massive air strikes. The key battle areas were on the eastern front near Soledar, Bakhmut, and Avdiivka in Donetsk oblast. Russia’s “big” offensive turned out to be advancing in “meters, not kilometers.” At Vuhledar, Russian forces suffered huge losses during waves of attacks, possibly as much as an entire battalion of elite troops, and this defeat undermined the Russian outlook for a new wide-scale offensive.

After months of defensive operations, Ukrainian forces stepped back from Soledar, and neighboring Bakhmut became a key battleground. After half a year of fighting, however, Russian forces did not manage to get control of the city. In late March the Russians were preparing to renew offensive operations at Vuhledar and to surround Avdiivka, repeating the tactics used at Bakhmut. Ukraine’s top officials and military command stressed the strategic importance of Bakhmut and planned to defend the city vigorously.

As Russia could not achieve much on the battlefield, the Russian military command changed tactics, adopting more terrorist methods, such as attacking critical infrastructure and targeting civilians. In late 2022 Ukrainian military officials reported that Russia was running out of stocks of missiles, which probably also affected the change in the tactic of air strikes. S-300 and S-400 missile systems (surface-to-air missiles that in NATO reporting are designated SA-10 Grumbles) were redesigned to conduct surface-to-surface operations but are inaccurate for this use. The Russians also started launching reconnaissance balloons and decoy targets to detect the locations of Ukraine’s air defenses.

The Ukrainian air defense has improved with international aid, but the arms the Ukrainian army has are not capable of hitting all incoming Russian missiles, including ballistic and supersonic ones, which the Russians are now using more often. In late March, after Russia failed to destroy Ukraine's power system, it started attacking more logistical infrastructure and military facilities while continuing to target energy facilities.

According to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, from the start of the invasion to the end of 2022, the Russian army lost 174,000 soldiers. Since the start of the full-scale war, Russia has potentially lost half its tank fleet. in March, tanks produced in the 1940s and 1950s were taken out of mothballs, reactivated, and sent to the front. The battles over Bakhmut were among the main sources of losses for Russia, which was losing five times more soldiers than Ukrainian forces. As of early March, Russian losses may have reached 20,000–30,000.

In March, some media published that Ukrainian forces had lost 100,000 killed and wounded. Ukrainian Security and Defense Council Secretary Oleksiy Danilov denied this, saying that estimate was a considerable overshoot. Danilov thought that Ukrainian losses in most cases were seven to eight times less than Russian losses.

POW exchanges took place but were slightly less active than during the previous three months. Russia found reasons to postpone and delay exchanges. For instance, the Russians canceled previously agreed-on prisoner swaps in January without explanation, and in February they started delaying exchanges, arguing that the prisoners didn’t want to go home.

Russia’s Position on the War
Russia's position on the war remained full of aggression and manipulations. Russia does not want to recognize its lack of success on the battlefield and the fact that it has not achieved any of the Kremlin’s proclaimed war goals. Because of this, the Russian presidential administration did not comment when the country entered the second year of the war. The Kremlin started promoting the message that this was a new patriotic war, on par with World War II.

Russia started promoting the narrative that it was the West that had unleashed the war against Russia, that the West was using Ukraine to try to divide Russia and make Russians suffer, and that NATO had become increasingly involved in the war.

Dmitry Medvedev, the former Russian president and now deputy chairman of the Russian Security Council and a leading voice of war, threatened to deploy nuclear arms and said Russia as a state would disappear if it lost the war. Medvedev repeated his earlier threat that “all of Ukraine will burn” if Ukraine attacked territories occupied by Russia. Ukraine dismissed this threat and continued conducting drone attacks on Russian military targets in the occupied territories in the first quarter of 2023.

Russian Information and Psychological Operations
Russia continued engaging in information warfare. In the first quarter of 2023, these efforts were mostly directed toward persuading Ukraine that Russia was succeeding in the war and toward demoralizing Ukrainian society. The battles for Bakhmut were among the key topics subjected to such factual manipulation.

Russia also persisted in spreading fake news abroad in hopes of persuading other countries to suspend military assistance to Ukraine. Among these fake news items, Russia said Ukraine was preparing to invade Russian-occupied Transnistria in Moldova. These pathetic news plants are by now familiar and join Russia’s repertoire of biochemical and nuclear false flag attacks and so forth.

Cyberattacks, also traditional, increased beginning in late 2021. In conjunction with the use of networks of internet bots to spread fake news, the Russian secret services tried to access computers in Ukraine by adding malicious code to the hacked software hosted on torrent websites.

Belarus’s Involvement
In January, Russian troops and weapons continued entering Belarus, and Belarus continued sending equipment to Russia. Both countries continued conducting joint drills, including along the border with Ukraine.

In late February an unmanned drone attacked a Russian military aircraft outfitted with an airborne early warning and control system—in other words, a spy plane—located at the Belarusian airbase in Machulishchy. The Russians were using the aircraft to conduct air attacks on Ukraine. Belarusian partisans took responsibility for this attack. After a week of denying it, Belarusian president Aleksandr Lukashenko acknowledged the attack and the damage done to the plane, but blamed Ukraine for the operation, and hinted at revenge: “The gauntlet has been thrown down.” Ukraine denied any connection to the operation. Earlier, Lukashenko had said the Belarusian army would join the Russian Armed Forces in the war only if Belarus was attacked.

The Situation with the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant
Despite negotiations, little progress was made in the demilitarization of the Zaporizhzhia NPP. Instead, Russia increased its military presence at the power plant. As the Ukrainian Foreign Affairs Ministry informed, Russian forces were blocking the rotation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) mission personnel in February.

The Russians continued their efforts to connect the NPP to the Russian power grid but still failed. They brought in personnel from some Russian NPPs, hoping to operate the plant themselves rather than oversee Ukrainian staff.

On March 9, as a result of a Russian air attack on Ukraine’s power system, the Zaporizhzhia NPP was disconnected from the external power supply for eleven hours, posing the threat of a nuclear accident. Five other disconnections had occurred during more than a year of Russian occupation.

UN Secretary-General António Guterres, during his visit to Kyiv on March 8, offered mediation for complete demilitarization of the NPP. But in late March Rafael Grossi, director of the IAEA, said they had given up on the idea of establishing a demilitarized zone around the plant. Grossi explained the decision in terms of the potential complications of verifying demilitarized objects located very close to the line of hostilities while also expressing concern that the decision could appear to legitimize Russia’s presence at the NPP. Negotiations over demilitarization had gone on for eight months.

Energy Terrorism and Other Attacks on Critical Infrastructure
Russia continued its attacks on the power system, hoping to cut off the power supply in Ukraine during the winter. In total, fifteen wide-scale attacks and dozens of smaller ones have taken place since the first massive attack in September 2022. In addition to power systems, Russia renewed its attacks on fuel storage facilities, which it had attacked massively the year before, in March and April 2022. In some cases, the attacks were followed by interruptions not only of power but also of water and heat supplies.

Attacks on Civil Infrastructure
Just as before, Russian artillery and air strikes continued to hit civil infrastructure and multi-apartment residential buildings, causing deaths and injuries. From the start of the full-scale invasion up to late February, the Russians have destroyed over 81,000 civilian targets, including 62,000 residential buildings, 23,000 educational institutions, and over 450 medical facilities.

Russian Crimes in the Occupied Territories
The Russian army, allied mercenaries, and occupational authorities continued conducting crimes against civilians in the occupied territories. The occupiers had sped up the deportation of Ukrainians and were seizing apartments to accommodate Russians. They tried to mobilize local residents to join the war on the side of Russia, tortured those who refused to obtain Russian passports, committed acts of sexual violence against adults and children, and have been preparing new waves of “filtration” in the occupied territories and throwing up new penal colonies. The German prosecutor general said the country’s law enforcement agencies have collected evidence of crimes numbering in the "three-digit range."

Crimes against Children
In addition to the above-mentioned crimes, thousands of children were kidnapped and deported. According to Ukraine’s official data, from the start of the war to the end of February 2023, more than 16,000 children had been deported to Russia, including 4,390 orphans, but the real number may be higher.

Russian families adopted some of these abducted children against their and their parents' will, in violation of the law. Some were sent to study in military colleges or to specially established political reeducation camps. Investigators have found evidence that all levels of Russia’s government have been involved in the operation of these camps.

Just slightly more than 300 children have been returned to Ukraine. At least 465 children are known to have died because of the hostilities since the invasion began, an additional 943 have been injured, and 365 are considered missing.

On March 17 the International Criminal Court issued a warrant for the arrest of Vladimir Putin and the commissioner for children’s rights in the Russian presidential administration, both allegedly responsible for the war crime of unlawful deportation of children from the occupied areas of Ukraine to Russia.

The European Commission and Poland proposed an initiative to search for kidnapped children. The European Commission, with the support of UN agencies, will hold a conference on this issue soon.

2. INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Russia’s Responsibility for the Donbas Occupation
On January 25 the European Court of Human Rights issued its decision in cases that had been brought by Ukraine and the Netherlands against Russia. The decision recognized that areas in eastern Ukraine in separatist hands were, from May 11, 2014, and up to at least January 26, 2022, under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation. For years, Moscow had denied any direct involvement in eastern Ukraine until the full-scale invasion began on February 24, 2022. The court’s decision clears a path to Russia being held responsible for human rights violations in the Donbas since 2014.

More States Recognize Holodomor (the Great Famine)
During the first three months of 2023, a few more countries progressed in recognizing the Holodomor (the Great Famine) of 1932–1933 as a genocide against the Ukrainian people organized by the Kremlin regime. Recognition came from the parliaments of Bulgaria and Iceland, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Italian Parliament, and Belgium's House of Representatives.

UN Secretary-General Guterres’s Visit to Ukraine
In March, UN Secretary-General António Guterres visited Ukraine and met with President Zelensky. The secretary-general assured Zelensky that the UN would “continue to seek solutions and a just peace for the people of Ukraine and the world.” Peace negotiations, the grain deal, and solutions to various humanitarian problems, including the problem of children being forcefully taken by Russia, were among the key topics of the talks. The agenda differed little from that of Secretary-General Guterres’s last visit to Ukraine, in August 2022.

Relations with the USA
The United States continued to be a key supporter of Ukraine in the war, providing aid on a regular basis. In early 2023 the United States announced an additional $3.75 billion in military assistance to Ukraine and countries affected by the Russian invasion, with aid packages to follow in the coming months.

During the first three months of 2023, Ukraine saw numerous unpublicized visits of top U.S. officials. On February 20, just a few days before the world entered the second year of the full-scale war, U.S. president Joe Biden paid an unannounced visit to Kyiv to meet President Zelensky and express U.S. support. Before this, the media reported, CIA director William Burns secretly visited Ukraine in February to discuss Russia’s war plans. Later, U.S. treasury secretary Janet Yellen visited Kyiv without announcement to reaffirm U.S. support and promote economic aid to Ukraine, and U.S. attorney general Merrick Garland made an unannounced visit to Lviv.

Relations with the EU and European States
In late March, President Zelensky called on Europe to accelerate the provision of military aid to Ukraine to shorten the war and prevent any delay in the start of Ukraine’s planned counteroffensive. During the whole quarter, this topic was key when negotiating with other countries as Ukraine was preparing to withstand new Russian attacks and readying its counteroffensive operations in the spring. Another important topic was preventing an energy crisis as Russia continued aerial attacks on the power system and other critical parts of the energy infrastructure.

In February, President Zelensky visited the UK, where he met with King Charles and Prime Minister Rishi Sunak and spoke in the British Parliament. As is customary by now, the principal topic was military support for Ukraine. President Zelensky then left for Paris to meet with French president Emmanuel Macron and German chancellor Olaf Scholz. The leaders left for Brussels together to attend the EU summit. Beyond the need for more support, during his speech Zelenskyy talked about Ukraine’s aspirations to join the EU. Later, the European Parliament passed a resolution calling for member states to provide Ukraine with military aid for as long as might be necessary.

Earlier, on February 2, the president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, visited Kyiv to discuss support for Ukraine before the country entered the second year of the general war. Other top representatives of different European states also visited Ukraine, including the president of Austria (who brought power generators; the country does not provide arms owing to its military neutrality), the president of Finland (to discuss military aid for Ukraine, including tanks), the Danish prime minister (to discuss the energy situation, the postwar recovery, and military aid), the Italian prime minister (to reaffirm support and announce a new package of military aid), the Spanish and Polish prime ministers (both reaffirming their intentions to send Leopard tanks to Ukraine), and Iceland’s prime minister (who signed a joint declaration with President Zelensky). The presidents of Poland and Lithuania expressed support for Ukraine’s efforts at European integration, while Latvian president Egils Levits visited Lviv together with President Zelensky and the two first ladies. Polish and Latvian representatives agreed to represent Ukraine’s security interests in NATO.

On March 31, the president of Moldova, Maia Sandu, visited Kyiv and met with President Zelensky and other top officials. President Sandu has often expressed support for Ukraine in its war against Russia. The two leaders discussed European integration prospects for both countries, improving infrastructure capacities between the two countries, and ways to withstand Russian aggression and hybrid influence. Kyiv officials said they had informed Chisinau of intelligence that Russia was planning to promote large-scale disorder and organize a coup in Moldova.

China
On February 23, timed to coincide with the anniversary of the start of the war, Beijing released its twelve-point position paper on the Russia-Ukraine war. The paper essentially calls for a ceasefire, a freezing of Russian positions in eastern Ukraine, and the lifting of sanctions. Some Western countries, including the United States and Germany, both key partners of Ukraine, expressed skepticism that the plan was truly oriented toward promoting peace, for the boilerplate language also urges an end to the “Cold War mentality,” by which Beijing means U.S. domination of a particular world order. Kyiv remained moderate and diplomatic in its comments: President Zelensky said that Kyiv shared some of the proposed points and that he planned to talk to China's leader Xi Jinping to discuss Beijing's proposal. Kyiv further proposed that Beijing sign on to Ukraine’s peace formula.

Ukraine and the West expressed concerns that China would supply weapons to Russia. U.S. intelligence officials said there were reasons to believe China would deepen its collaboration with Russia.

Japan
On March 21, Japanese prime minister Fumio Kishida visited Kyiv without fanfare. The visit coincided with Chinese leader Xi Jinping's visit to Moscow and thus was symbolic in demonstrating support for Ukraine from another leading Asian country. In February Japan pledged $5.5 billion in humanitarian aid to Ukraine, with Prime Minister Kishida reinforcing that Russia’s aggression was “a challenge to the rules and principles of the entire international community.”

Ukrainian Peace Formula Developments
Ukraine continued taking steps to promote its own peace formula. The “Ukrainian Peace Formula,” so dubbed by President Zelensky and first proposed in late 2022, identifies ten areas in which some agreement must be reached to secure a lasting peace and end the war: “radiation and nuclear safety, food security, energy security, the release of all war prisoners and deportees, implementation of the UN Charter and the restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity and world order, the withdrawal of Russian troops and the cessation of hostilities, restoration of justice through war tribunals and reparations, [measures to] counter ecocide, security guarantees for Ukraine, and confirmation of the war’s end.” As expected, Russian representatives continue to reject the plan, saying it is “out of the question.”

On February 23 the UN General Assembly supported the Ukrainian Peace Formula, with 141 states voting in favor of the resolution initiated by Ukraine, "Principles of the Charter of the United Nations underlying a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine."

Tanks and Aircraft
At the start of the war, countries manufacturing tanks declined to supply them to Ukraine or to allow other states to do so. Less than a year later, the picture had changed. In early January 2023, Polish president Andrzej Duda during his visit to Ukraine said his country was ready to send a company of German-origin Leopard 2 tanks (about ten tanks) it owned if Germany approved the deal, thus keeping the transfer within the framework of the international coalition. Four more countries joined the initiative within in a few days while waiting for Germany’s decision.

According to media reports, German chancellor Olaf Scholz was ready to approve the decision only if the United States would also send its Abrams tanks. The pressure on Berlin increased when UK prime minister Rishi Sunak promised to send Challenger 2 tanks. After long debate, German officials said they would not mind other counties supplying German-origin tanks, and shortly thereafter Chancellor Scholz said Germany would itself send tanks. U.S. president Joe Biden also stated that his country would send thirty-one Abrams tanks to Ukraine.

Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Finland, Sweden, Canada, and some other countries expressed their intention to send Leopard tanks. During the Rammstein meeting in mid-March, U.S. defense secretary Lloyd Austin said Ukraine would receive 150 Leopard tanks from nine countries. Some of the Leopard and Challenger tanks had arrived by the end of March, and some Ukrainian soldiers had finished training abroad to use them.

In late January, Polish prime minister Mateusz Morawiecki said the country was ready to send F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine if NATO approved the decision, but was also ready to send Soviet-design MiG-29 fighter jets. Ukrainian officials have often said the country needed fighter jets, including F-16s. But the final decision is still far from implementation. In the meantime, additional countries have expressed their readiness to send Ukraine MiG-29 jets.

Developments with the Grain Export Agreement
In 2023 Russia continued creating obstacles to agreed-upon grain exports and againsought to fabricate the geographic destinations of the shipments to make it appear that needy countries were getting far less than they were actually getting. Grain exports in January fell by half as Russia deliberately slowed ship inspections. During the 2022–23 season, Ukraine’s grain exports fell by almost 30 percent. Moreover, the crop area has decreased by 25 percent because of the war.

The grain shipment deal through the Sea of Azov was set to expire on March 18, and Moscow was signaling it had no interest in extending the agreement. Kyiv, for its part, wanted to expand the list of ports covered by the deal to include the port in Mykolaiv, which had handled 35 percent of Ukrainian food exports before the Russian invasion. Kyiv also planned to establish an insurance fund for civilian ships entering its ports to move grain, in a bid to boost exports.

At the last minute, in mid-March Russia stated it was ready to extend the agreement for sixty days only. Ukraine’s officials said that offer contradicted the terms of the agreement, which stipulated a 120-day prolongation period, as was later confirmed by UN representatives. Kyiv said it would keep to the 120-day prolongation period. On March 20, Russia threatened to withdraw from the agreement altogether unless some sanctions were lifted. Despite this formal impasse, Ukrainian grain shipments have continued to leave the country sporadically, and the Russians have continued to throw up artificial obstacles.

Other Developments
Ukraine expanded its list of foreigners under sanction. The country introduced sanctions against Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad, the Syrian prime minister and foreign affairs minister, and a few hundred Russian citizens, including cultural figures, while continuing the nationalization of Russian assets in Ukraine. Parliament recognized the Russian Wagner Group as an international criminal organization, and President Zelensky introduced sanctions against companies affiliated with the group. The Verkhovna Rada has canceled all treaties with Russia concerning the Sea of Azov.

3. INTERNAL AFFAIRS

The Economic Situation
Because of the war, Ukraine’s economy fell by almost a third in 2022. The economy has stabilized after a year of war, but the Ministry of Economy forecasts only a 1 percent growth in 2023, down from earlier forecasts of 3.2 percent.

The money supply increased in 2022 by 20 percent. Inflation amounted to 22.6 percent. Improving the energy supply situation has had a beneficial effect on the economy.

In late March the IMF approved a $15.6 billion loan for Ukraine as part of a $115 billion package to support the country's economy. Ukraine’s signing a memorandum of cooperation with the IMF commits the country to carrying out a new package of reforms. The Ukrainian government also signed a memorandum of agreement with the IMF and its G7 creditors on postponing debt payments until 2027.

The Energy Situation
In the first quarter of 2023, Russia continued air strikes on Ukraine’s power system. The missiles and drones were poorly effective, however, because of the high efficiency of Ukraine’s air defense, and the Ukrainian power system did not collapse. Nonetheless, consumers saw scheduled cutoffs to balance the power system and unscheduled blackouts during and after some attacks.

By mid-February the power system was operating stably, and consumers have faced few interruptions since then. Electricity imports from Europe, the quick pace of repair of facilities that came under attack, nuclear power plants operating at full capacity, and an increase in outputs from solar power plants with the sunny weather all contributed to stabilizing the power system.

Government Reshuffles
On January 18, Internal Affairs minister Denys Monastyrsky, his first deputy, the state secretary, and some other ministerial officials died in a helicopter accident near Kyiv while flying to Bakhmut. The official announcement of the cause of the crash has not yet been published. Parliament subsequently appointed a new minister, Ihor Klymenko, who was formerly head of the National Police. Parliament also appointed Vasyl Malyuk head of the Security Service of Ukraine. Malyuk had served as acting head since President Zelensky dismissed Ivan Bakanov, an old friend of Zelensky who had been in the cabinet soon since after Zelensky was inaugurated.

The chiefs of the Ministry for Education and Science and the Ministry of Strategic Industries were also reshuffled. Mykhailo Fedorov, minster for digital transformation, added to his portfolio the newly established position of vice prime minister for innovation, development, education, science, and technologies.

In addition to the above changes, four deputy ministers from three ministries, the deputy head and adviser of the president's office, the deputy prosecutor general, and the governors of five regions were fired within a short period of time for different reasons, including suspicion of corruption related to state purchases.

4. PROGRESS IN REFORMS AND SUCCESS STORIES

The scandals and suggestions of corruption surrounding state procurement processes have renewed pressure on President Zelensky to confront corruption swiftly. At the same time, Ukraine has improved its position on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index during a year in which most rankings remained static. According to the national survey, most Ukrainians have not faced corruption in recent years. More than half of respondents said they had not faced corruption at all, while 1–6 percent said they had encountered corruption from specific public bodies or public service providers.

The Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) marked the progress Ukraine has made in corruption prevention among members of parliament, judges, and prosecutors. GRECO concluded that Ukraine has implemented or satisfactorily dealt with fifteen out of thirty-one recommendations. Nine of the remaining recommendations have been partially implemented, while seven have yet to be implemented.

GRECO approved the removal of Ukraine from its black list of states where structural changes are blocking anti-corruption efforts or where the anti-corruption effort is "globally unsatisfactory." GRECO’s report commented that despite the all-out war effort, “it is remarkable that Ukraine has nevertheless continued its work to implement GRECO's recommendations.”

In March the government approved a new state Anti-Corruption Program for 2023–2025. The proposed measure would apply to “judiciary proceedings, state regulation of the economy, customs affairs and taxation, public and private sectors of the economy, construction, land relations and infrastructure, the defense sector, health care, education and science, and social protection.” Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal described the program as a living document and said executors would work closely with the heads of other anti-corruption agencies and stakeholders to improve the program over time.

In early March the government approved the appointment of Semen Kryvonos as director of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU); he was chosen from among three candidates selected by the independent committee. He will serve a seven-year term as director of NABU. Previously Kryvonos was head of the State Inspectorate for Architecture and Urban Planning. The position of director of NABU is critical because disbursal of the vast amounts of foreign aid flowing into Ukraine cannot be tainted by corruption and because Ukraine’s bid to join the EU depends heavily on eliminating long-standing corrupt practices.

The opinions expressed in this article are those solely of the author and do not reflect the views of the Kennan Institute.