#106 U.S. Policy in the Third World: The Limits of Power

By Richard E. Feinberg

The perception is widespread that the United States' ability to influence events in the third world is in decline. The explanations in vogue today cite such causes as the adverse drift in the strategic balance, detente, the so-called Vietnam syndrome, or incompetent policymakers. This paper offers alternative, structural explanations for the decline of U.S. influence independent of these variables.

Sluggish economic growth in the industrial world and instability in commodity and capital markets have made it more difficult for the United States to provide friendly governments with an environment of economic stability. Moreover, the decline in official finance has deprived the United States of potential leverage. Aid has declined sharply as a percentage of GNP, and the ratio of official flows to private capital flows has fallen dramatically. Private capital refuses to take risks or forego profitable opportunities merely because Washington has contrary political objectives. In addition, industrial states are now engaged in a heated competition for export markets, and Western Europe and Japan are likely to place export performance above alliance political considerations.

The Nixon Doctrine relied heavily on the "regional influentials" to protect U.S. interests. Yet, many of these nations are themselves unstable. Nor have they always been willing or able to act in accordance with U.S. interests in their own region. Their own sense of national interest has sometimes led them to distance themselves from the United States or even to seek to expand their own influence at the expense of the United States. U.S. relations with business groups and militaries in the third world are also examined. Both groups have often proven to be unreliable allies. Third-world businessmen may join popular front movements, or blindly oppose minimal social reforms and thereby generate instability.

Businessmen may form nationalist alliances with the state, implement unsuccessful economic policies, or be unable to maintain power. Third-world militaries can also be nationalistic, and even rightist authoritarian governments now defy the United States on a host of international issues. Moreover, militaries have inherent difficulties in establishing durable regimes and can even themselves generate political instability and radicalization.

Administrations which fail to realistically adopt goals that take these trends into account will inevitably produce failures and disappointments and expose themselves to charges of incompetence, lack of will, or even betrayal.