#154 Interstate Conflict in Latin America

By Gregory F. Treverton

From the Introduction

Many North American stereotypes of Latin America are wrong. The region has not, for example, been violent or prone to conflict in the middle decades of the twentieth century. Prior to the South Atlantic War of 1982, the last major interstate war in the region had been the Chaco War of 1932-35. Between the Peru-Ecuador conflict of 1941 and the 1969 clash between Honduras and El Salvador, there was no sustained outbreak of interstate violence. Nor is the region heavily armed in comparison to other areas of the world. During 1976-78 military expenditures consumed only 1.6 percent of the region's gross national product (GNP) and only 10.2 percent of central government budgets, compared with figures for the developing world as a whole of about 5 and 20 percent, respectively. Arms imports by Latin American countries were only about 7 percent of all arms imports by the developing nations during 1976-78.

That is not to say, of course, that the region has been tranquil or its military establishments inactive. There have continued to be changes of government by other than legally-prescribed means. This chapter looks at one set of security issues underscored by recent events, in particular the South Atlantic war coming on the heels of the armed conflict between Peru and Ecuador. Are interstate conflicts such as these aberrations or coincidences? Or do they suggest that "traditional" conflict, even armed conflict, between states--over territory, resources, colonial legacies, political rivalries, or some combination of these--will be more likely in the future than in the past? If so, why? What implications would this development have for the policies of governments of the hemisphere and among them? It is not necessarily disparaging to observe that Latin American militaries have dressed better than they have fought because, happily, they have fought (each other) so seldom; or that they have been more likely to be preoccupied with governing than with responding to external threats. Will that continue to be the case? Or will nations of the region begin to feel that they must prepare for war even if they do not seek it, fuelling arms races and raising the chances of armed conflict by miscalculation? Will temptations to prepare nuclear options increase?